Corporate governance - Vigil

The results show that the percentage of women board members nearly doubled over ten years. (…)

Gadflies at the Gate: Why Do Individual Investors Sponsor Shareholder Resolutions? is the catchy title of a new paper (8/2006) by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan. Its part of the Stanford Closer Look Series from the Corporate Governance Research Initiative. While I am happy to see a more objective view the role retail shareholder advocates play in corporate governance than the nonsense presented by Steven Davidoff Solomon, I’m not sure what Gadflies at the Gate really adds by raising questions without advancing answers. I suppose, like many academic papers, it is pointing out the need for further research, like a cobbler calling for more shoes. I advise further reading that is more action oriented.

August has arrived and, with it, little additional clarity on next steps in the Brexit process. Speculation remains rife about the objectives of the UK Government in the negotiations. Will it seek access to the single market, will it pursue a clean break from the EU, or will a hybrid engagement model emerge? What has become clear in recent weeks, however, is who will be leading the negotiations. David Davis, the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, will manage the negotiations on the UK’s behalf, while Michel Barnier, a former European Commissioner responsible for financial services, will act as the EU’s chief negotiator.

Investors are pushing hedge funds to commit to a set rate of return before they earn incentive fees, as managers are pressured to borrow a page from their competitors in private equity. Hedge funds are agreeing to so-called hurdle rates to assuage

Testing the effect that environmental, social, and governance (ESG) proposals have on firms’ subsequent ESG performance and market valuation, Jody Grewal, George Serafeim, and Aaron Yoon find that 42 percent are financially beneficial and associated with subsequent increases in environmental and social performance.

On August 10, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”) announced its second major enforcement action against an employer for using contracts with employees that seek to impede employees from engaging in protected whistleblowing activity.

Are takeover defenses good or bad for shareholders? The answer depends on whom you ask. Many researchers find support for the view that takeover defenses entrench managers and decrease firm value (e.g., Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009)). But others find that takeover defenses are associated with improved value and performance (e.g., Linn and McConnell, 1983; Caton and Goh, 2008; Chemmanur and Tian, 2013; Smith 2013). In this paper, we propose that takeover defenses confer costs and benefits to a firm’s shareholders that change in systematic ways as the firm ages. Previous findings are mixed because they do not account for this lifecycle effect in takeover defenses