ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS
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ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS
ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS is a division of KROTOASA RESEARCH INTENSIVE INSTITUTE (KRII), which refers to all Alkebulan communities and Diaspora Slave Descendants who lost their claims to land through colonialism and slavery, also communities with deep historical indigenous ties to the lands, natural resourses and environment, who maintain unique cultures, traditional practices and self-governance,. Alkebulan is considered the oldest and indigenous name for the continent of Africa, translating to "Mother of Mankind" or "Garden of Eden". Used by ancient Moors, Nubians, and Ethiopians, it predates the European-imposed name "Africa" and represents a push to reclaim pre-colonial African identity and history.
Alkebulan Indigeon also points to the rich diversity of Africa's original inhabitants, whose traditional lives and rights are central to understanding the continent's complex history and ongoing social dynamics. These are groups of people native to a specific region, people who lived here before colonist arrived.

Indigenous People like the San and Khoekhoe population both carrying mtDNA +100 000 years in Southern Africa are recognised indigenous peoples by the United Nations and UNDRIP., These two groups chose different lifestyles as hunters and herders but after colonialsm many Khoekhoe populations became hunters due to dispossesion and Genoicide by European and Bantu Settlers. Bantu Settlers was named by the Khoekhoe people as "Xhosas" and adopting the cultures and rituals of the KhoeKhoe population, Bantu's are distinct from the majority African populations who migrated and lost their historic continuity of their culture, tribes, indigenous livestyles, territories and surrounding natural resources.

Political Participation: Indigenous People lack political representation and participation, economic marginlization and poverty, lack of access to social services, discrimination, and protection of rights.

Alkebulan's marginalization in global politics and economics stems from a mix of historical legacies of colonialism, global politics and global economic structures that favor commodity exports, leading to asymmetrical trade, capital flight, and limited industrialization. Key factors include dependence on external powers, poor infrastructure, illicit financial flows, and structural disadvantages within global trade rules, despite rich resources.

Alkebulan's revolution of sweeping transformation, primarily the anti-colonial independence movements (Decolonisation of Africa 1950 -1970s), the anti-colonial restistance, the political revolution, the economic and social revolutions, the labour revolutions with key drivers and goals of self-determination by ending foreign control and achieving political independence and economic independence by moving from exporting raw materials to manufacturing in areas where extraction taking place.
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Oxford Statue Row Stirs Ghosts of British Colonialism

Oxford Statue Row Stirs Ghosts of British Colonialism | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

Oxford statue row stirs ghosts of British colonialism

Dario Thuburn
Wed, 30 December 2015 at 1:36 pm GMT+2
 
A popular movement at the University of South Africa forced the removal of a statue of British colonialist Cecil Rhodes
 
Oxford University has agreed to a six-month "listening exercise" on whether to remove a statue of British colonialist and white supremacist Cecil Rhodes following a student campaign and heated debate
 
Students in Cape Town defaced the statue of British mining magnate Cecil Rhodes, a white supremicist seen as a symbol of Britain's toxic legacy of colonialism
 

A popular movement at the University of South Africa forced the removal of a statue of British colonialist Cecil Rhodes

A popular movement at the University of South Africa forced the removal of a statue of British colonialist Cecil Rhodes

The toxic legacy of colonialism in Africa has stirred up a heated debate in Britain involving a prestigious Oxford University college, some high-powered alumni and a student campaign boosted by social media.

 

The focus of the debate is an unremarkable limestone statue looking down on Oxford's High Street of Cecil Rhodes, the Victorian-era tycoon who founded the De Beers diamond company and what is now Zimbabwe."To put someone so literally on a pedestal is to tacitly condone their legacy," said Daisy Chandley, a student and organising member of the Rhodes Must Fall in Oxford campaign.Smudged by passing traffic on a busy thoroughfare and soiled by pigeons, the Rhodes statue is still in a stunning location surrounded by Oxford's dreaming spires in the heart of the university's college community.

 

An inscription underneath pays homage to Rhodes -- a white supremacist like many builders of the British empire -- for his donation to Oriel College.Inspired by the popular movement that forced the removal of a statue of the famous colonialist at the University of Cape Town in South Africa, campaigners have been asking the British college to do the same.- 'Wider racism' -The campaigns are distinct but supporters in Oxford use the same hashtag #RhodesMustFall as the Cape Town campaign and their actions have fuelled a political debate in South Africa as well as soul-searching in Britain ranging well beyond the statue itself."

 

There have always been those who have questioned the statue as well as the wider racism within the university but the movement in South Africa brought debate over similar problems in Oxford to the forefront and triggered collective action," Chandley told AFP.The university rejects accusations of racism but Oriel College promised to be "more diverse and inclusive of people from all backgrounds" in a response to the campaign earlier this month.It said it would take down a Rhodes plaque on the wall of another college building and agreed to a six-month "listening exercise" on whether to remove the statue.

 

The college said Rhodes's values "stand in absolute contrast to the ethos of the scholarship programme today and to the values of a modern University".It said it would put up a sign in an antique window below the statue saying that "the College does not in any way condone or glorify his views or actions".But it also talked up the positive contribution of the Rhodes Scholarships, which have allowed 8,000 students from around the world to study at Oxford, including former US president Bill Clinton and former Australian prime minister Tony Abbott.

 

One of the organisers of the campaign, South African Ntokozo Qwabe, was himself named a Rhodes Scholar last year and has defended himself against charges of hypocrisy by saying that he is taking back some of the money that Rhodes took from Africa."I'm no beneficiary of Rhodes. I'm a beneficiary of the resources and labour of my people which Rhodes pillaged and slaved," he wrote on Facebook.- 'A man of his times' -Academics, politicians and famous Oxford alumni have waded into the row, heatedly debating the rights and wrongs of honouring a man who was a major driver of British territorial expansion in southern Africa and a key player in the Boer Wars that left thousands dead.One opponent of the campaign even compared it to the monument-destroying Islamic State group.

 

In a letter to The Times newspaper, South Africa's last white president F. W. de Klerk, who shared a Nobel Peace Prize with anti-apartheid icon Nelson Mandela, dismissed the campaign as "folly"."If the political correctness of today were applied consistently, very few of Oxford's great figures would pass scrutiny," wrote de Klerk, who was key in ending racial segregation in South Africa.

 

The Economic Freedom Fighters, a radical left-wing party in South Africa, expressed "disgust" at de Klerk's comments and called for his Nobel to be revoked."All apartheid and colonial statues and symbols must fall, not just here in South Africa, but the world over," it said in a statement.But in an open letter to Britain's Independent daily, Abbott said Rhodes was "a man of his times".

 

"The university should remember that its mission is not to reflect fashion but to seek truth and that means striving to understand before rushing to judge."

 

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Oxford college to launch scholarship in attempt to address slavery legacy | University of Oxford | The Guardian

Oxford college to launch scholarship in attempt to address slavery legacy | University of Oxford | The Guardian | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

All Souls, which received substantial payment in 1710 from slave owner, to fund one student a year from Caribbean nations

 
Richard Adams Education editor
Fri 10 Nov 2017 18.08 GMT
 

Oxford’s All Souls College is attempting to redress the bitter legacy of slavery that for hundreds of years has helped it maintain its position as one of Britain’s richest and most prestigious academic institutions.

 

Following long internal debate, the college’s fellows have agreed to launch an annual scholarship scheme, funding graduates from Caribbean countries to study at Oxford, alongside a five-year grant for a higher education college in Barbados.

 

All Souls is understood to be considering further action to commemorate the suffering of slaves who unwillingly contributed to the college’s success.

 

The college’s tentative steps recognise the enormous financial benefit All Souls was gifted by former fellow Christopher Codrington, a slave owner and sugar plantation magnate who in 1710 bequeathed part of his fortune for the college to establish the magnificent library that bears his name.

 
 

Codrington’s will left £10,000 – a sum equivalent to tens of millions of pounds today – to All Souls, which commissioned the architect Nicholas Hawksmoor to design the library that opened in 1751 and has been in use ever since.

Codrington also used his wealth to found Codrington College in St John, Barbados, a theological college affiliated to the University of the West Indies that All Souls now plans to gift £100,000 over five years.

“All Souls is pleased to be funding scholarships for graduate students from the Caribbean, and to support Codrington College in Barbados in this way,” a spokesperson for All Souls said.

 

The moves are the latest efforts within Oxford to address historical injustices, after a burst of publicity when students protested the continued commemoration of Cecil Rhodes, the Victorian imperialist who endowed the university with a huge fortune derived from colonial exploitation in southern Africa.

 

The controversy engulfed Oriel College, which displays a statue of its former student Rhodes, and culminated in a strenuous public debate inside and outside the college over the sculpture’s fate.

Shreya Lakhani of Common Ground, an Oxford student group highlighting the university’s imperial legacy, said All Souls’ actions were “small steps in the right direction” but said the college could do more given its wealth and status.

 

“We don’t think the steps All Souls has taken are enough, although obviously these are good steps in themselves,” Lakhani said. “Other colleges should look at this and take note, and it might act as a nudge for other people.”

Common Ground argues that All Souls should change the library’s name and relocate Codrington’s marble statue and portrait to avoid “glorifying” him – although the college says it has no plans to do so.

 

“The people we celebrate are reflections of our past but also expressions of our present day values,” Lakhani said.

In June last year All Souls attracted student protests over Codrington’s legacy. In one case a student bound in chains stood outside the college entrance, with “All Slaves College” painted on his chest.

 

All Souls sits at the apex of Oxford’s academic elite, a small but wealthy college that admits few postgraduates – freeing its fellows from onerous teaching or research obligations. Its “distinguished fellows” include the former Conservative cabinet ministers John Redwood and William Waldegrave.

 

Despite its size All Souls has one of the richest endowments in Oxford, approaching £300m, according to some estimates, although without students its income is limited. The college was one of several Oxbridge institutions that appeared in the Paradise Papers revelations, investing funds offshore in the Cayman Islands.

 

The new graduate scholarships will pay for the postgraduate tuition fees and living expenses of one student a year who is a national of a Caribbean country, although it will not include a fellowship at All Souls itself.

 

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New MSt in Histories and Cultures of Colonisation

New MSt in Histories and Cultures of Colonisation | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

Graduate Studies

27 Aug 2026

 

A new MSt in Histories and Cultures of Colonisation will be open for applications from autumn 2026.

 

Colonial conquest and settlement are at the heart of global history. They form the basis of modernity, as well as of the structures defining contemporary global capitalism. Since its inception, colonialism has generated manifold movements and cultures of resistance. These lay bare the inegalitarianism of colonial ideology and pursue multiple alternative ways of imagining local, national, and global cultures. 

 

This flagship new MSt in Histories and Cultures of Colonisation is groundbreaking in being the first to study together the histories and cultures of colonisation. It will be taught by both historians and cultural scholars, combining methodologies from both disciplines to provide a multifaceted understanding of colonisation and its aftermaths.

 

The course examines the historical mechanics of colonialism in various regions of the globe. It also analyses cultural movements, philosophers, writers, and artists that have articulated forms of anticolonial critique. Historical sources are read alongside theoretical, cultural, and literary work to provide a uniquely profound understanding of the political, economic, and social significance of colonial histories.

 

The course also analyses and compares different forms of colonialism as they were implemented throughout history by different powers across Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Students will choose to focus on the tensions of decolonial cultures produced in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Italian and Russian as they answer back to colonial power in the colonial language, while maintaining dialogue with local and indigenous languages and cultures.

 

In (co)taught seminars and in their own research, they will also unpack the history of ideas and ideologies that led to the critique of colonial models. 

 

Applications will open in autumn 2026 for first entrance in the 2027/28 academic year.  Further details on the course content and structure will be published in September 2026. 

 

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Harvard's $100mln Slavery Research Project Plagued by Controversy 

Harvard's $100mln Slavery Research Project Plagued by Controversy  | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it
  • ByAl Mayadeen English
  • Source: The Guardian
  • 19 Apr 2026 10:06
6 Min Read

 

Harvard University's landmark initiative to examine its historical ties to slavery has become mired in allegations of obstruction and suppression.

 

 

Christopher Newman, a doctoral student at Howard University specializing in African diaspora and Caribbean studies, was escorted off Harvard's campus by police officers in July 2024 after completing an internship with the university archives.

 

He had been creating an annotated bibliography for the Harvard and the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, a $100 million project launched in 2022 to examine the university's ties to slavery across three centuries.

 

Newman told The Guardian that after meeting descendants of people enslaved by a Harvard benefactor and trafficked from Antigua to Cambridge, Massachusetts, he repeatedly raised the need to investigate Harvard's connections to Antigua. He said he was met with radio silence. "It seemed like nobody was really trying to hear that," he said.

 

After a human resources meeting, Newman was escorted off campus, banned from the premises, and denied permission to collect his belongings. He said he was told a flight back home was booked for that afternoon. "I was asking too many questions," Newman said, "veering off of the proverbial beaten path."

Multiple researchers fired, academics resign

Three Harvard-affiliated academics have stepped down from their posts with the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, accusing the university of obstructing their work. The former executive director of the initiative stepped down for "personal reasons" and 11 researchers working on projects related to the initiative were fired.

Two professors wrote in a letter published by the Harvard Crimson that the university had tried to "delay and dilute" efforts to connect with descendant communities while designing a memorial on campus.

 

Vincent Brown, a history professor at Harvard, stepped down from his role last winter after a research team visiting Antigua was unexpectedly fired. "I felt like I was basically sacrificing my scholarly reputation to stay on a project that didn't have scholarship as its priority," he said.

Researchers say Harvard limiting scope of inquiry

Caitlin DeAngelis, an independent researcher hired by Harvard in 2017, found the names of more than 200 people who were enslaved at a Harvard-affiliated plantation in Antigua, including a 15-year-old boy named Richard Oliver. She shared the source material with her supervisors, yet none appeared in the final version of the Harvard and the Legacy of Slavery report, which claims the number is unknown.

 

"They tend to limit the number of people that they acknowledge, rather than to read the historical record in a way that is expansive and more accurate," she said. "It's definitely evasive."

 

DeAngelis said the president's office told her directly not to discuss her ongoing research with students and that a course she was teaching called "Slavery at Harvard" was changed in the course catalogue to include a focus on abolition without her consent.

"My understanding of Harvard's orientation towards its research was that it was a PR measure to limit both publicity and legal liability," DeAngelis said. "My role was to hold down a desk that allowed Harvard to mislead the press about how serious they were about making reparations."

Antigua's requests for reparations ignored

Officials in Antigua have tried to engage in a dialogue with Harvard about reparations for nearly a decade. In 2016, Ronald Saunders, the US ambassador from Antigua and Barbuda, urged the university to "demonstrate its remorse and its debt" and proposed annual scholarships for Antiguan students.

In 2019, Prime Minister Gaston Browne wrote that "we consider Harvard's failure to acknowledge its obligations to Antigua and the stain it bears from benefitting from the blood of our people as shocking if not immoral." He requested an official meeting.

The only response from Harvard has been online business development courses offered to the University of the West Indies, reportedly at a discount of 10 to 20 percent. A spokesperson for the Antiguan government said the word reparations was explicitly avoided in discussions.

Harvard's deep historical ties to Caribbean slavery

Harvard's connection to Caribbean slavery dates back to the 1640s. John Winthrop, one of the university's founders, oversaw the massacre of at least 700 Indigenous people during the Pequot War and enslaved people himself. His youngest son, Samuel Winthrop, dropped out of Harvard and became one of the first planters to settle permanently in Antigua, enslaving 64 people on a 1,000-acre plantation.

 

At the height of its colonial period, Antigua was covered with more than 200 sugar plantations. At least six different plantations on the island were owned by early Harvard benefactors or leaders who collectively enslaved at least 362 people and potentially more than 600 people.

 

Before being fired, independent researcher Richard Cellini's team had identified more than 900 enslaved people and nearly 500 living descendants, a number Cellini estimated could be about 10,000. Harvard's latest figures, released in February, acknowledge 1,314 formerly enslaved people and 601 living descendants.

University defends its efforts

A Harvard spokesperson said the university does not comment on personnel matters but noted that Newman was an intern at Harvard Library, not with the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, which is the only group authorized to engage in descendant research and outreach.

 

Regarding the omission of enslaved people's names from the 2022 report, the spokesperson said, "The data in the report was carefully researched and sourced, reflecting our best understanding at the time."

 

On the discounted courses offered to the University of the West Indies, Harvard said it "has provided course sharing" for students and that "faculty from both institutions have participated in conferences and programs hosted by each institution."

 

Carla Martin, a Harvard lecturer of African and African American Studies, described the Legacy of Slavery Initiative as "window dressing" and "more performative than substantive." She said, "It remains very opaque to us, what is possible."

 

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God Save the Colonizer | The Harvard Crimson

God Save the Colonizer | The Harvard Crimson | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it
God Save the Colonizer
By Sameer M. Khan, Crimson Opinion Writer
 
Sameer M. Khan ’24, a Crimson Editorial editor, is a History of Science and Social Anthropology concentrator in Adams House
September 20, 2022
 

I imagine that hearing of the death of Queen Elizabeth II must have been a paralyzing moment for citizens of the United Kingdom, a collective experience so totalizing that the Kingdom’s ten days of mourning just might not suffice to properly memorialize her tremendously long rule. After all, the world she departed has aged quite a bit since she assumed her reign in 1952, exactly 70 years ago.

 

But for me, the Queen’s death — her ability to now peacefully populate the pages of history — solemnly reminds me that time can be too kind to institutions of power and their agents; that for the Queen to now inhabit the past is a privilege which her colonial subjects, tortured well into the present by the consequences of British imperialism, will never hold.

 

In particular, it is a luxury the people of Kashmir — my people, forever shackled to her memory — will never hold. And while the Queen likely forgot Kashmir by the end of her life, the people of Kashmir will not be spared from remembering her name and the suffering she sowed in their land.

 

Although the Partition of India, Pakistan, and Kashmir in 1947 — a treacherous bloodbath architected by the British that claimed the lives of approximately one million people — predated the Queen’s rule, the Indian subcontinent was still well-inscribed within Britain’s colonial playbook.

 

Indeed, the nations born of Partition hardly belonged to themselves. India and Pakistan did not triumph post-1947 as paradises of independence; rather, the footprints of the British who had so callously mapped borders and bodies in the Indian subcontinent against each other based largely on religious demographics were not only visible, but also alive. Manufactured by Partition were not new nation-states, but still-breathing artifacts of British coloniality. What had been performed as a profound gesture of decolonization on the international stage had instead only reproduced the horrors of British imperialism.

 

Kashmir, in particular, became the connective tissue that Britain leveraged to maintain and tighten its colonial gaze in the Indian subcontinent — and, most remarkably, it became the biggest loser in this imperial exchange. It was Queen Elizabeth’s Britain that had consolidated tensions between India and Pakistan by inflaming and prolonging both states’ colonial dreams of acquiring Kashmir, all with no intention to formally intervene in fears of losing economic support in the region.

 

Indeed, to the British, Kashmir was not a people to protect or a land to be liberated — it was a political balancing act, lives cruelly contorted into the grooves of its colonial imagination. It was Queen Elizabeth’s Britain that trivialized the self-determination of the Kashmiri people, deftly dangling above their heads the fantasy of conducting a plebiscite in Kashmir that would determine whether the region would join India or Pakistan or become its own internationally-recognized state. To this day, almost a century after Britain’s 1948 United Nations Security Council vote in its favor, such a plebiscite has never been held. And it was Queen Elizabeth who considered her political interest in the Indian subcontinent one of “noninterference,” which, frankly, makes me chuckle — because what is more invasive and political than colonialism?

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But despite the violence she engineered in my homeland, I do not wish Queen Elizabeth pain in death. I only wish to puncture this protective veil we seem to cast on figures of history, who, upon their death, are allowed to luxuriate in the past, untouched and beautified.

 

In Kashmir, there is no such thing as the past. Genealogies of occupation in the Kashmir Valley can be traced to the late-sixteenth century, when Sultan Yousuf Shah Chak — the final indigenous ruler of Kashmir — was deposed by the Mughal emperor through a trick of deception now all too familiar to the Kashmiri eye: settler-colonialism, disguised as a call for peaceful negotiations.

 

Colonization in Kashmir is uniquely embodied. From the toppling of the Shah dynasty to the Valley’s infamous reputation as the most militarized region today, settler-colonialism has crystallized in the bodies of every Kashmiri. For us, one occupier is no different than the other, no history more past than the other. Life in Kashmir bends time and space — and to breathe in Kashmir is not to inhale, but to gasp for air, for relief.

 

I resent the Queen because, when Kashmiri people die, there is no space in the past for them. When Kashmiri people die, they just disappear — no ten days of mourning, but just ten more days, months, years, and centuries of the same, endless nightmare of occupation.

 

But these histories are not forgotten; they are erased. Harvard, in particular, knows well the violence inflicted by its own effaced colonial histories, as well as the promise of decolonial knowledge production — knowledge committed to deconstructing our sanitized public memory and honoring the silenced victims of colonialism.

 

Harvard must expand its probing into colonial encounters, though, beyond its gates. From Harvard to Kashmir and beyond, it is through this kind of counter-hegemonic engagement with institutions of power that we may learn, for once, to empower communities like the Kashmiri people. And it is through this radical attempt at unlearning that we may no longer worship a woman who, before she became a queen, bled the color of a colonizer.

Sameer M. Khan ’24, a Crimson Editorial editor, is a History of Science and Social Anthropology concentrator in Adams House.

 

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Decolonization at 100: Centenary Reflections, 1926-2026 

Decolonization at 100: Centenary Reflections, 1926-2026  | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

Date and Time

April 23, 2026
All day

pin_dropLocation

History Department Conference Room (#125)

35 Quincy Street
Robinson Hall
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

 

Please Note: Registration for this event is now closed. However, it will be live streamed in an adjacent seminar room in Robinson Hall (Warren Center Conference Room B21), or you can follow the discussion live on Zoom. More information to follow.

Decolonization at 100: Centenary Reflections, 1926-2026

Workshop, 23 April 2026
Harvard University, Department of History, Robinson Hall 125
 

In April 1926, the term ‘decolonization’ entered the modern political lexicon, making its first appearance in German in the work of a now largely forgotten political economist. Moritz Julius Bonn’s conviction that “the era of welding large areas into empires has come to an end” seems unremarkable in retrospect. More surprising is the way he included Germany among the places to be decolonized. With the confiscation of its colonial empire as the price of peace, Germany had forfeited its own right to self-determination in Bonn’s eyes (Ward, 2016). 

 

By the 1960s this expansive logic had given way to an altogether narrower definition that aligned decolonization squarely with the liquidation of Europe’s empires overseas. With clear binaries and neat chronologies, it heralded successive waves of newly independent states across Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Historians and social scientists could not only be confident about when and where decolonization was to be found, but also that they knew “the end of the story” (Cooper, 1996).

 

That conceptual clarity has been challenged in recent years with the proliferation of “decolonization talk” across the humanities and social sciences (Roy and Kundnani, 2025). Both the temporal and geographical scope of decolonization, as well as the range of social phenomena it might plausibly describe, have expanded exponentially – so much so that critics have raised objections to its “promiscuous application” (Tàìwo, 2022). According to this view, decolonization risks becoming “freighted with so many elements that it loses coherence” (Thomas, 2024).

 

Paradoxically, this widening of decolonization’s semantic range has occurred at a time when its moral imperatives are widely flouted in the international system. The expansionary policies of all three major powers have acquired a distinctly unapologetic edge since Russia’s capture of the Crimea in 2014 – from Ukraine to Panama, Greenland, the South China Sea and Taiwan. On the face of it, these matter-of-fact territorial designs run directly counter to the presumption of irreversibility that was hard-wired into decolonization from its very inception. 

 

Where does this leave decolonization as it enters its second century? Can it still furnish a useful category for analysis? And what purposes does it serve in settler societies like Australia, where successive attempts to refashion the constitution to realign the country with a decolonized world have been defeated at the ballot box. No longer, it seems, can decolonization assume that it has history on its side. 

 

This workshop marks the centenary of decolonization by considering the prevailing uncertainty about its enduring critical purchase – not just among scholars but also in contemporary social and political disputes. It will consider a range of contemporary contexts where decolonization’s everyday uses have multiplied – from Australia to the Pacific to the Global South; from former imperial powers to global superpowers – even as its reach and resonance remain hotly contested.

 

Format: The workshop will be held over a single day on Thursday 23 April 2026, with a series of discussion panels featuring short presentations from panelists followed by discussion. 
 

Program 

9.00-9.20: Welcome and Introduction

Stuart Ward (Harvard/Copenhagen)

Hans Kundnani (LSE/Göttingen)


9.20-11.10: Panel 1. Decolonization: reflections on a disputed term

Linda Colley (Princeton)

Lisa Ford (GWU)

Frederick Cooper (NYU)

Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò (Cornell)

Moderator: Kris Manjapra (Northeastern)


11.10-11.30: Coffee


11.30-13.00: Panel 2. Decolonizing Australia, the US and the Pacific

Patricia O’Brien (Georgetown)

Kristin Oberiano (Wesleyan)

Christina Twomey (Monash)

Moderator: Joan Beaumont (Australian National University)


13.00-14.00: Lunch


14.00-15.30: Panel 3. Decolonizing Colonizers

Britain: Erik Linstrum (UVA)

France: Mary Lewis (Harvard)

Australia: Jon Piccini (Australian Catholic University)

Moderator: Hans Kundnani (LSE/Göttingen)


15.30-16.00: Coffee


16.00-17.30: Panel 4. Decolonization Deferred: Global superpowers

The United States: Elisabeth Leake (Tufts)

China: Rana Mitter (Harvard)

Russia: Jane Burbank (NYU)

Moderator: Stuart Ward (Harvard/Copenhagen)


17.30-18.30: Keynote: The checkered career of an elusive subject 

Dane Kennedy (GWU)

Moderator: Heather Salter (Northeastern)


18.30-20.00: Reception

Please Note: Registration for this event is now closed. However, it will be live streamed in an adjacent seminar room in Robinson Hall (Warren Center Conference Room B21), or you can follow the discussion live on Zoom. More information to follow.

 

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Michael Witgen (Columbia): The Battle for North America: Indigenous Nations and the Birth of the American Empire 

Michael Witgen (Columbia): The Battle for North America: Indigenous Nations and the Birth of the American Empire  | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

Date and Time: October 20, 2026

03:00PM - 04:00PM EDT
 
Robinson Hall, 35 Quincy St, Room 125, Cambridge, MA 02138
 

The European empires of the Atlantic World established colonies in North America in order to enact the fantasy of discovery.

 

That is, they came to settle and civilize the New World. This European colonial project gave birth to the American republic, the first New World colonial power. Claiming an origin in North America, the Republic came into being as both a colonial power and a nation of settlers.

 

This project, the American experiment in self-governance, began as an extension of the original European colonial project in the western hemisphere. Both the original European colonial scheme, and the one undertaken by the United States, imagined North America as unsettled wilderness, and colonization as a civilizing mission.

 

Framed in this way the expansion of the Republic beyond the original thirteen states into the western interior could be understood as a benign conquest of nature, when in fact it was an audacious imperial project -- a grandiose scheme to steal a continent.

 

However, a theft this bold would require more than a plan that merely called for the colonial subjugation of Native peoples and their land. It would require a totalizing colonial project organized around a political economy designed to plunder Native land and resources, while simultaneously claiming these things as the birthright of the first newly formed, civilized, and post-colonial, American nation-state.  

 

Michael Witgen is a professor in the Department of History and the Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race at Columbia University.

 

He is a citizen of the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Ojibwe.  Witgen studies Indigenous and Early American history with a particular focus on the Great Lakes and Upper Mississippi Valley.

 

His publications include “An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), and Seeing Red: Indigenous Land, American Expansion, and the Political Economy of Plunder in North America, which was a finalist for the 2023 Pulitzer Prize in history, winner of the James A. Rawley Prize from the Organization of American Historians, the Caughey Prize from the Western History Association, and the state history prize from the Historical Society of Michigan.

 

This event is provided by the Harvard in 1776 Initiative and is a component of the monthly Department of History seminar. This event is open to the public and a light spread will be provided.
 

Sponsors:
Charles Warren Center
Harvard University Native American Program
Laurel Thatcher Ulrich

 

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ANC attacks AfriForum, Solidarity and the DA, and Defends BEE, Land Reform, and Employment Equity which still Excludes the KhoiKhoi-Bushman Indigenous People of SA

ANC attacks AfriForum, Solidarity and the DA, and Defends BEE, Land Reform, and Employment Equity which still Excludes the KhoiKhoi-Bushman Indigenous People of SA | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

 

The African National Congress (ANC) said that it rejects the United States administration’s announced withdrawal of South Africa’s AGOA eligibility.

 

This statement followed a day after the United States decided to remove South Africa from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) on 1 January 2027.

 

This will end South Africa’s duty-free access to the United States market for key industries, which will hurt the agriculture and car manufacturing industries.

 

In response to this announcement by the United States, the ANC said that it will not allow economic pressure to dictate South Africa’s foreign policy.

 

It added that the United States’ actions would not force it to abandon the responsibility to reverse colonial and apartheid injustices.

 
 

“AGOA provides tariff preferences. Its withdrawal does not close the American market or mean economic collapse,” it said.

 

“Claims of catastrophic job losses confuse the broader United States trade relationship with exposure to AGOA preferences.”

“Nevertheless, government must protect affected workers and industries, strengthen local production and expand alternative markets.”

 

The ANC said that land reform, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment and employment equity are democratic instruments of redress.

 

“Their gains, though incomplete, were hard won. Abandoning transformation would entrench apartheid’s economic inheritance and strip political freedom of economic substance,” it said.

 

The ANC condemned campaigns by AfriForum, Solidarity and the Democratic Alliance against transformation.

These campaigns, the ANC said, had contributed to international pressure on South Africa.

 

“The announcement’s timing during special voting, alongside economic misinformation, deepens concern about attempts to intimidate voters and undermine democratic choices,” it said.

“Our history of resistance, the Freedom Charter and the Constitution demand that we defend sovereignty, equality and economic justice.”

 

 “We honour those who sacrificed for liberation and the progressive Americans who stood against apartheid.”

 

The ANC said that it supports diplomacy and mutually beneficial trade with the United States.

 

“We will not surrender transformation for preferential market access. AGOA may be withdrawn. Our struggle for economic emancipation will continue. We will not be bullied.”

Impact on South African exporters

South African exporters are weighing potential job losses and squeezed margins after Washington moved to end the country’s duty-free access to the US market.

 

However, economists and analysts said the broader economic fallout in South Africa was likely to be limited.

 

With one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, South Africa will feel the effects of any losses, the country’s largest trade union, COSATU, said.

 

“We cannot afford to abandon a single worker, business, industry or community,” it said, blaming white interest groups for spreading lies that led to South Africa’s exclusion.

 

President Donald Trump has targeted the country largely due to what he says is its persecution of white people, which Pretoria says is a false narrative spread by fringe groups.

 

“It is long overdue that proponents of the white persecution myths appreciate the very real damage that their endless lobbying and antics in the US have done to bilateral relations,” COSATU said.

But agricultural economist Wandile Sihlobo said there had been talk of removing South Africa from AGOA for more than a decade because it is an upper-middle-income country and should have a more reciprocal trade agreement with the US.

 

“Being excluded or graduating out of AGOA does not necessarily mean that South Africa loses market access to the US. All this means is that there will be additional tariffs,” he said.

 

For most products, it will be an additional tariff of around 3.4%, he said. Almost 90% of South Africa’s exports to the US already fall outside AGOA.

 

Business lobby group Business Unity South Africa said the number of job losses was likely to be in the range of a few thousand.

 

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The Gilded Gavel: The Impact of Private Funding on the ConCourt

The Gilded Gavel: The Impact of Private Funding on the ConCourt | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it
Siyabonga Hadebe
 
Published 1 year ago
 
 

The ConCourt’s dependence on foreign funding from ideologically driven foreign funders raises concerns about “directed justice”. While direct interference seems improbable, this system subtly channels influence.

 

THE Constitutional Court of South Africa stands as a potent symbol of hard-won freedom, a gleaming architectural and jurisprudential rebuke to apartheid’s tyranny. Its rulings on socio-economic rights, dignity and equality promised a rupture from a past where the state — the colonial and apartheid corpus — stood irrevocably alienated from, and hostile to, the Black majority; the demos.

 

However, the very foundation supporting this beacon exposes a troubling continuity: its heavy reliance on private, mostly foreign funding, routed through the Constitutional Court Trust (CCT).

Although originating from post-1994 necessity and cloaked in noble intent, this private funding model acts as a sophisticated agent of recolonisation. The model sustains “assisted justice”, promotes “directed justice”, favouring elite and external interests, and systematically excludes the Black majority from genuine control of their highest constitutional guardian, reasserting the damaging corpus-demos divide beneath a veneer of liberal ideals of constitutionalism.

 

Tshepo Madlingozi’s article, Social Justice in a Time of Neo-Apartheid Constitutionalism, critiques South Africa’s post-1994 constitution. He argues that it created a “neo-apartheid constitutionalism” because it has not dismantled the country’s deep-seated social divides. He contends that by extending human rights without first decolonising the Western concept of humanity, the constitution risks merely transforming the status of the formerly oppressed to one that imitates their former colonisers.

 

On the other hand, Mogobe Ramose argues that the Constitution has constitutionalised the injustices of colonial conquest by ignoring the ethical imperative to redress its epistemological, economic and political consequences. Meanwhile, Sanele Sibanda adds that the Constitution, shaped by dominant group interests, was never designed to achieve genuine social justice or structural transformation. The mere existence of the Constitutional Court Trust, a conduit for privatised power and the collapse of public order in South Africa, entrenches Achille Mbembe’s notion of “fiscality”.

 

Fiscality means that political legitimacy and institutional survival become tethered to the capacity to attract, manage and appease private, usually foreign, sources of capital, rather than to the democratic will of the people. In this paradigm, judicial independence risks being subtly recalibrated to align with donor priorities, while people are reduced to passive observers of legal processes supposedly carried out in their name.

 

Thus, this article argues that the ConCourt’s infrastructure and raison d’être are an artefact of financial dependency, translating constitutional ideals into market-compatible, donor-approved jurisprudence. This dependency on external funding has allowed the post-apartheid state and its foreign collaborators to repurpose colonial institutions and laws in a way that entrenches neo-patrimonial rule.

 

This means that despite the shift to democracy, the state’s structures continue to exclude the majority and favour a select few. The result is a form of recoloniality, where the state functions as an impersonal entity (corpus) that is fundamentally disconnected from its people (demos), prioritising elite dominance over inclusive governance.

 

According to the CCT website, it was established in 1995 and manages funds for the Court’s benefit, supporting law clerks, the library, the Art Collection and initiatives like the African Law Clerks Exchange. Its donor roll reads like a directory of Western philanthropic power: Ford Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Carnegie Corporation and European governments.

 

Notably, the Carnegie Corporation funded a five-volume “poor white” study on impoverished Afrikaners in the 1930s, whose recommendations have since been criticised for entrenching segregation and laying the groundwork for apartheid. And Open Society Foundations, meanwhile, has long been criticised for using its global grant-making to shape judicial and policy agendas in ways that align with liberal capitalist orthodoxy.

 

This dependency is structural and troubling. The CCT claims to avoid funds from entities likely to litigate before the Court, primarily sourcing from overseas, while placing contributions by South African capital, usually white, to anonymity via a US intermediary. Now acting as benevolent Good Samaritans of the post-1994 period, South African capital largely retains apartheid-era structures, has moved capital abroad, and has avoided transformative measures.

 

Professor Njabulo Ndebele interprets this seemingly virtuous arrangement as white capital evading responsibility to redress historical injustice, leaving Black South Africans trapped in what Frantz Fanon called the “zone of non-being”.

 

Together, these dynamics construct a paradigm of “assisted justice”: the ConCourt depends on external patronage instead of being fully supported by the people it serves. The South African state, shaped by a colonial legacy of extraction, cannot adequately fund its apex court, leaving it reliant on supposedly benevolent foreign donors.

 

This mirrors what Australian academic Ntina Tzouvala calls a “standard of civilisation”, which grants conditional inclusion for non-Western communities only if they conform to capitalist modernity. As a result, human rights become a moving target, and South Africa’s Black majority is denied full rights while expected to meet shifting Western expectations.

 

This arrangement replicates the colonial logic in which essential governance functions depend on external validation and resources. It undermines the ConCourt’s perceived sovereignty and establishes a subtle trusteeship, where the Black majority are reduced to passive recipients of externally enabled justice, rather than sovereign custodians of their apex court. This replicates the “private ownership” model of the SA Reserve Bank (Sarb).

The ConCourt’s dependence on foreign funding from ideologically driven foreign funders raises concerns about “directed justice”. While direct interference seems improbable, this system subtly channels influence. Funders have particular perspectives on human rights, the rule of law and development. The CCT, needing sustained support, may consciously or unconsciously prioritise projects aligned with donor interests.

 

For example, significant funding for the African Law Clerks Exchange, though commendable, could encourage a transnational legal framework preferred by these foundations. Likewise, the globally acclaimed Art Collection, supported by the US Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation, may eclipse urgent funding needs for direct access to justice initiatives benefiting rural and marginalised communities.

 

The Trust’s elite composition, comprising esteemed justices and professionals, further distances funding priorities from the lived realities of the Black majority. Justice becomes “directed” not by the demos (the people), but by a convergence of international philanthropic trends and domestic elite perspectives. This risks marginalising locally rooted conceptions of justice still grappling with apartheid’s economic and spatial legacies.

 

Even though the ConCourt’s jurisprudence is portrayed as formally independent, it operates within an ecosystem subtly shaped by foreign benefactors’ preferences. This mirrors colonial administrations that designed legal systems to serve imperial interests rather than local needs. Neo-apartheid, recoloniality, and state capture are more real than perceived. The elites and influential groups, including the media, NGOs and academia, have found ways to misinform, leaving the majority disempowered and structurally excluded from meaningful participation in institutions meant to protect their rights.

 

The core injustice blemishing the post-apartheid dispensation is the systematic exclusion of the Black majority from playing a meaningful role in supporting their Constitutional Court. The CCT model exposes a deep divide between the state and its people, as the state is almost admitting to failing to fund a critical branch of government and outsources this responsibility to foreign entities and a domestic elite managing the trust.

 

The state of paralysis appears intentional as the economy and security continue to flounder, while both local and funders prioritise their own interests. Navy Admiral Monde Lobese has warned that severe budget constraints have left the SANDF logistically paralysed, undermining its ability to secure the country’s maritime borders. He emphasised that this vulnerability is not due to a lack of will, skill or commitment from the Navy, but rather the failure of the National Treasury and government to adequately resource the military.

 

Similarly, Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi’s recent “revolt” can be seen as another symptom of structural neglect, where key state institutions are incapacitated and forced to operate under severe resource constraints. These instances exemplify Mbembe’s concept of “privatised sovereignty”, in which extractive economic priorities and selective allocation of coercive power undermine the state’s capacity to protect citizens and strategic assets.

 

State Security Minister Khumbudzo Ntshavheni has warned that “one of the risks [facing the country] is the risk of coup d’état”. However, she avoided addressing the deeper, systemic patterns of elite capture and institutional neglect that continue to erode the South African state and its democratic framework.

 

Meanwhile, the Black majority, whose liberation the court symbolises, are structurally sidelined. Their potential contributions are funnelled into anonymity, denying them the dignity and agency of visible investment in their constitutional future. This exclusion mirrors a broader economic alienation, where Black South Africans remain disproportionately locked out of ownership and control. The social contract is undoubtedly hollowed out, as the court and other key institutions, reliant on distant patrons rather than the people they serve, risk becoming institutions above the demos, not of it.

 

Breaking this cycle requires a radical reimagining grounded in decolonial praxis. The South African state must be held fully accountable for financing the Judicial Branch, including the Constitutional Court. Reliance on the CCT (foreign funding) for its functions constitutes state failure and perpetuates recolonial dependency. Decolonial financing could include a transparent endowment from corporate or wealthy contributions, with strong safeguards, and visible public participation to ensure collective ownership and accountability.

 

This means that the CCT must be strictly supplementary, with all funding fully disclosed and debated to ensure projects serve local justice priorities, not donor agendas. Rebuilding the ConCourt and a just justice system on the sovereignty, resources and visible participation of South Africans, especially the Black majority, will allow it to transcend colonial shadows, fulfilling the transformative constitutionalism promised in 1994. The gavel must reflect the people’s will, not distant patrons.

 

Around 2020, former Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng caused a stir when, in his Judiciary Report, he revealed that he had been offered R600 million to “modernise” the courts. The courts’ poor condition, central to delivering justice, reflects persistent underinvestment and neglect. This revelation came at the height of ex-President Jacob Zuma’s arrest, which Mogoeng likely deemed immoral and unlawful. Unfortunately, he retired abruptly before disclosing full details of the sponsorship, highlighting where real power truly lies.

 

Siyayibanga le economy!

 

* Siyabonga Hadebe is an independent commentator based in Geneva on socio-economic, political and global matters.

** The views expressed here do not reflect those of the Sunday Independent, Independent Media, or IOL.

 

 

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Who Conquered South Africa ? 

Who Conquered South Africa ?  | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it
 

African Economic History, 2024

 

The right of conquest is a doctrine in the theory of international law in terms of which victory in war entitles the victor both to the title to territory of the vanquished as well as sovereignty over them. Far from being a mere event, however, conquest is an ongoing process, structure, and relation of domination.

 

Despite the widely celebrated “transition to democracy” and the supposed triumph of popular sovereignty in South Africa in the past three decades, we argue that South Africa’s “democratic” constitutional order remains firmly rooted in the dubious right of conquest asserted since the defeat of its indigenous people in the unjust wars of Western colonization, which began in the mid-seventeenth century.

 

In this article we critically reflect on South African historiography by asking “Who conquered South Africa”? The question is necessary because sovereign power is both misunderstood and obfuscated in South African contemporary history and public discourse. We argue that conquest, and its attendant concepts of sovereignty and war, are deliberately underemphasized in South African historiography despite being at the root of problems regarding economic sovereignty.

 

Our argument considers the problem of succession to conquest, in terms of which both the title to territory and sovereignty over the conquered is transferred from the conqueror to another party who then enjoys these entitlements and powers. We trace various successors in title to Conquest South Africa, and show that their economic power originates in the right of conquest.

 

Their ownership of South Africa’s natural resources originates in the title to territory acquired through its disseisin following the conquest of the indigenous people, and in the same way their continued de facto sovereignty over that population now takes the form of the wanton and relentless exploitation of their labor power.

 
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The 1871 Annexation of Griqualand West: Dismantling Waterboer/Griqua Sovereignty 

The 1871 Annexation of Griqualand West: Dismantling Waterboer/Griqua Sovereignty  | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

 

Abstract

 

The 1871 annexation of Griqualand West by the British Crown marked a pivotal moment in the history of the Waterboer/Griqua community. This article examines the annexation as a forcible usurpation of sovereignty rather than a voluntary cession of authority, drawing on primary archival documents, secondary scholarly analyses, and tertiary legal frameworks. The consequences included the loss of territorial authority, termination of customary law enforcement, functional dispossession, and recognition under modern South African constitutional law.

 

I. Introduction

 

Before 1871, the Waterboer/Griqua community functioned as a self-governing polity with recognized territorial and administrative authority. Their sovereignty was codified through treaties, internal political systems, and customary law. The British annexation transferred full administrative control and sovereignty to the Crown, effectively terminating the community’s governance. This article explores the legal and historical significance of the annexation, drawing on:

 

• Primary sources: treaties, correspondence, and colonial administrative records;

• Secondary sources: historical and legal scholarship analyzing Griqua governance and colonial annexation;

• Tertiary sources: constitutional provisions, South African case law, and historical summaries. The analysis demonstrates that the annexation satisfies both historical and modern tests of dispossession, forming a foundation for contemporary restitution claims.

 

II. Historical Context

 

The Griqua were a heterogenous, semi-autonomous community of mixed-race origin, primarily under the leadership of the Waterboer clan in Griqualand West. Following the 1834 treaty with the Cape Colony, Nicholas Waterboer’s authority was formally recognized, including powers over land management, settlement, and customary law enforcement.^1 In 1852, the community conducted a formal election of Nicholas Waterboer, demonstrating a structured governance system.

 

British colonial interests in the diamond-rich territory intensified in the 1860s, culminating in the annexation of Griqualand West in 1871. The Crown assumed full sovereignty, transferring all administrative, legislative, and executive authority away from the Waterboer council.
 
III. Loss of Territorial
 
Authority Prior to annexation, the Waterboer/Griqua community exercised continuous territorial governance, including:
 
• Defining boundaries and regulating settlement;
• Administering land allocations;
• Exercising judicial and administrative authority.
 
The annexation removed these powers, leaving the community without practical control over their ancestral land. Although customary ownership persisted conceptually, sovereignty—the effective control over territory—was terminated.
 
Archival correspondence confirms that the Griqua council previously enforced boundary demarcations and settlement regulations, which were immediately superseded by colonial authorities after 1871.
 
Scholars have noted that the removal of territorial authority constitutes a functional test of dispossession, as the community could no longer exercise the core features of sovereignty.
 
IV. Termination of Customary Law Enforcement
 
Customary law was central to the Waterboer/Griqua political system. The 1871 annexation effectively nullified the council’s ability to enforce laws within its territory. While internal governance structures persisted culturally, they lacked legal enforceability under British colonial rule.
 
Secondary sources highlight that the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty replaced indigenous legal authority, leaving customary law largely symbolic. This marked a shift from treaty- recognized governance to a dispossessed status under colonial administration.
 
V. Functional Dispossession
 
The concept of functional dispossession focuses on whether the effective exercise of governance has been removed, irrespective of formal ownership. The annexation meets this test:
 
• Executive powers were assumed by the Crown;
• Legislative authority over the territory was centralized under colonial administration;
• Judicial functions were transferred to colonial courts.
 
Even if the community retained “customary ownership” in their own view, the removal of functional control over governance and territory satisfies both historical and modern definitions of dispossession.
 
VI. Modern Legal Recognition: Constitutional Reclassification
 
Under Section 25(7) of the South African Constitution (1996), the expropriation of indigenous property without consent constitutes prima facie evidence of dispossession.
 
The 1871 annexation, executed without the Griqua community’s consent to alienate their land or governance rights, satisfies this constitutional criterion.
 
Case law confirms the legal significance of historical dispossession. In Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community, the Constitutional Court recognized the validity of restitution claims based on historical dispossession and loss of indigenous governance.
 
Tertiary sources contextualize the annexation within broader colonial practices of indigenous dispossession, highlighting its systemic impact on self-governing communities.
 
VII. Conclusion
 
The 1871 annexation transformed the Waterboer/Griqua community from a self-governing sovereign entity into a dispossessed population deprived of administrative, territorial, and legal authority. The annexation represents a clear usurpation of governance, rather than a voluntary relinquishment of rights.
 
Historical, legal, and constitutional analyses converge to confirm that the event constitutes:
1. Loss of territorial authority;
2. Termination of customary law enforcement;
3. Functional dispossession;
4. Constitutional recognition of dispossession under Section 25(7).
 
This foundation provides a compelling basis for contemporary restitution claims and the recognition of indigenous governance rights in South Africa.
 
 
Footnotes (OSCOLA-style)
 
1. Cape Archives Repository, C.A.R. 1834/12/45, ‘Treaty Between Nicholas Waterboer and the Cape Colony’, 1834.
 
2. Kimberley Public Archives, Waterboer Correspondence, Box 7, Folder 2, 1852 Election Records.
 
3. British Parliamentary Papers, Colonial Office 87/234, 1869–1870, ‘Reports on Griqualand West’.
 
4. Ibid.
 
5. Van Niekerk, Indigenous Land Rights and Colonial Annexation in Southern Africa (Juta 2012) 45–58.
 
6. Penn, The Griqua and the British Empire: Law and Land in Nineteenth-Century Southern Africa (University of Cape Town Press 1999) 112–135.
 
7. Ibid.
 
8. Claassens and Cousins, Land, Power and Custom: Contested Land Rights in South Africa (HSRC Press 2008) 73–91.
 
9. Ibid.
 
10. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 25(7).
 
11. Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC).
 
12. Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid (Blackwell 1994) 92–97.
 
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Lesotho and Swaziland (Eswatini) Independance from South Africa

Lesotho and Swaziland (Eswatini) Independance from South Africa | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

 

Lesotho and Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) remained separate from South Africa because British protection, native leadership, and strong local resistance kept them out of the Union of South Africa in 1910, followed by British decolonization policies that refused to hand them over to South Africa’s apartheid regime.

 

Key Reasons for Their Separation

 

* British Protectorate Status: In the 19th century, leaders of both territories—King Moshoeshoe I of the Basotho (Lesotho) and Swazi monarchs—sought British intervention to protect their people from encroaching Boer and British colonial expansion. Britain made them "High Commission Territories," administering them separately from the colonies that later formed South Africa.


* Exclusion from the 1910 Union: When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, provisions were made for Lesotho, Eswatini (and Botswana) to possibly be transferred later. However, local populations strongly resisted incorporation, and the British government balked due to growing racial segregation and discriminatory policies in South Africa.


* Rejection of Apartheid Transfer: After the National Party instituted apartheid in 1948, the political and moral climate made it impossible for Britain to transfer Black African populations to South Africa's oppressive regime.


* Geographic and Strategic Defense: Lesotho used its rugged Maloti Mountains and natural fortress terrain (such as Thaba Bosiu) to defend against outside forces. Eswatini maintained a distinct sovereign monarchy through strategic diplomacy and resistance against Boer land grabs.


* Decolonization in the 1960s: Rather than being absorbed by South Africa, both nations achieved full independence from Britain—Lesotho in 1966 and Eswatini in 1968—establishing themselves as sovereign UN member states.


Learn more about regional history and international borders via Britannica's Southern Africa History Overview.

 

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Indigenous People: A CONFERENCE of South African museum curators last week resolved to back demands for the body parts of a Khoisan woman whose pickled brains and genitalia are being stored in a ba...

Indigenous People: A CONFERENCE of South African museum curators last week resolved to back demands for the body parts of a Khoisan woman whose pickled brains and genitalia are being stored in a ba... | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

New bid for body parts

1 MAY 1996, 03:00
6 min read

 

A decision by curators will allow indigenous people to claim back body parts of ancestors which have been kept at museums, writes Eddie Koch

 

A CONFERENCE of South African museum curators last week resolved to back demands for the body parts of a Khoisan woman whose pickled brains and genitalia are being stored in a back room of the Museum of Man in Paris.

 

The conference also agreed to negotiate a system that will ensure large collections of human skeletons from indigenous people now in South African museums – many of them collected during colonial wars of conquest – be returned into the custody of their descendants.

 

The bold move, which will push this group of academics into negotiations with local organisations representing Khoisan people and Griqua communities who have Khoisan ancestry, opens exciting new research methods for archaeologists and anthropologists.

 

Khoisan hunter-gatherers were the first inhabitants of Southern Africa during the Stone Age and were relentlessly persecuted by white colonialists and also the majority African population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

 

The Griqua National Council and the Khoisan Representative Council have asked President Nelson Mandela to back their demands for the Paris Museum to return the body parts of Baartman, a Khoisan woman who was taken to England and France so that she could be exhibited there as a circus freak in the early nineteenth century.

 

South Africa’s Arts and Culture Ministry has taken up the challenge and opened negotiations with the French embassy in Pretoria in an effort to circumvent French law which prevents the government in Paris from interfering with the autonomy of museums that are notorious for refusing to return the heritage of developing countries.

 

But the issue has kick-started a domestic controversy as indigenous peoples’ organisations discover that large collections of body parts are being kept at local universities and research organisations.

Martin Engelbrecht, researcher for the Khoisan Representative Council, says the various clans and communites who have descended from the original Khoisan population will never know peace until their ancestors bones have been returned and treated with dignity.

 

At the South African Museums Association (Sama) annual meeting in Kimberley last week, curators responded by adopting a formal resolution – which will shortly be forwarded to the government – expressing their support for the return of Baartman’s remains.

 

They also recognised the sensitivity of some of their own collections and supported a suggestion that scientists gather in Cape Town this weekend to begin discussing formal policy guidelines about how to meet demands for restitution in a sensitive way.

 

And, to show their seriousness, they decided to set up a task group whose job it will be to “develop a comprehensive policy on the delineation and restitution of sacred and sensitive material”. Sama also asked the government to fund a research program to document and make public an inventory of all human remains in local and overseas institutions.

 

Graham Avery, head of the human sciences division at the South African Museum, points out there is vast potential for museums and community groups to collaborate around the restitution and management of remains.

 

The museum has arranged a workshop in Cape Town this weekend to “develop a professional framework, for South African circumstances, within which the heritage sector can negotiate more widely on issues of sensitive collections and foster an atmosphere for open, constructive and intercultural cooperation”.

Khoisan and Griqua groups have also expressed a readiness to seek compromises between their needs and the interests of scientists. “We know we are only a community if we can get enough knowledge about what happened to our people… We could be open to the suggestion that we put the bones back in the ground but in a way that scientists can still get access,” says Engelbrecht.

 

“When it comes around to researching and delving into the past we support that,” adds Mansell Upham, an advocate who represents the Griqua National Council. “To hegemonise the remains or hijack them would prevent people gaining from an understanding of the past and would be self-defeating.”

@ Domestic in dispute with Ranchod

Rehana Rossouw

 

DEPUTY Speaker and South Africa’s ambassador designate to Australia, Dr Bhadra Ranchod, has been accused of exploiting and unfairly dismissing his domestic worker.

 

Ranchod vehemently denied this claim by the South African Domestic Workers Union (Sadwu), which is representing his former employee, Cynthia Maqaqa, of Khayelitsha.

The union claims Maqaqa was fired with immediate effect in February after she insisted on taking a lunch break at 1pm. She admitted banging her fist on a table when confronting Vibha Ranchod about her break.

 

She said Dr Ranchod had agreed she could take her lunch break at 1pm, but his wife insisted she continue working until 3pm.

Maqaqa was a live-in domestic worker at the Ranchod’s Rondebosch flat in Cape Town. She was first employed by them in October 1994, dismissed and then re-employed in November 1995.

 

She claimed that when she was fired in February, she was not given notice, leave or overtime pay. Sadwu sent a letter to Mrs Ranchod claiming R700 notice pay, R130 leave pay and R11 149 in overtime pay. The overtime amounts to 2 368 hours.

Union organiser Michael Sedgewick said Maqaqa worked from about 6.45am to 11pm on weekdays and 7am to 4pm on Saturdays, working an average of 80 hours a week.

 

The Basic Conditions of Employment Act stipulates that domestic workers should not be expected to work more than five hours continuously or more than three hours overtime daily.

Sedgewick said he sent a letter to Ranchod on March 4, demanding settlement of Maqaqa’s claim. He met Mrs Ranchod and her lawyers last month, but failed to resolve the dispute.

 

Ranchod said this week his wife was Maqaqa’s employer, but that he was prepared to settle the matter as soon as Sadwu provided him with the exact amount owing to her.

“My wife is very upset about all of this. Cynthia was part of our family, we treated her like one of us. For the whole of December we gave her leave because my wife was away,” he said.

 

“We have asked the union to specify whatever they think is owed by us. We have already given them an undertaking to pay what is due, yet the union can’t come up with the exact amount.”

However, the Mail & Guardian has a letter from Sadwu dated March 4 which stipulates Maqaqa’s claim. A subsequent letter sent to the union by Ranchod’s lawyer refers to that letter in the very first line.

 

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Cecil Rhodes statue to remain at Oxford after 'overwhelming support' | University of Oxford | The Guardian

Cecil Rhodes statue to remain at Oxford after 'overwhelming support' | University of Oxford | The Guardian | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

Oriel College has said it will not remove the controversial statue of Cecil Rhodes at Oxford University despite a campaign by students who believe the British imperialist’s legacy should not be celebrated.

 

The Rhodes Must Fall movement said the statue of the man who was an ardent imperialist and left a sizeable sum to the college in his will, was representative of Britain’s “imperial blind spot” and should be taken down.

 
 
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Oxford College to Investigate its Own Role in Colonialism | University of Oxford | The Guardian

Oxford College to Investigate its Own Role in Colonialism | University of Oxford | The Guardian | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

 

Oxford college to investigate its own role in colonialism
This article is more than 7 years old

New academic post will enable St John’s to study the part it played in the British Empire

 
Richard Adams Education editor
Thu 21 Mar 2019 19.04 GMT
 

An Oxford college is to examine its contribution to creating and maintaining Britain’s colonial empire, in a pioneering effort to crowdsource and “decolonialise” its own imperialist past.

St John’s College is advertising for a new academic post whose appointee will work on a research project named St John’s and the Colonial Past, alongside Prof William Whyte, the college’s vice-president and professor of social and architectural history at Oxford.

 

The college said the post would be unique within Oxbridge as an effort to investigate its own history, including the education of both apologists and critics of the empire, and hopes it will “set the standard for future work in other institutions”.

 

The job application specifically highlights the recent controversy over the Rhodes Must Fall campaign which began in South Africa and spread to Oxford, due to the financial links between Oriel College and its imperialist benefactor and alumnus Cecil Rhodes. The campaign is calling for the removal of a statue of Rhodes at the college.

 

“The drive to ‘decolonise the university’ or, at any rate, to think through the implications of institutional involvement in the imperial projects of the past – is now a global business,” the college said in announcing the post. “As yet, however, no college in Oxford or Cambridge has seriously undertaken research into its involvement in colonialism.

 

“This project will explore connections between the college and colonialism, uncovering benefactions to St John’s and the alumni who served in the empire. It will also investigate the monuments, objects, pictures, buildings that evoke the colonial past.”

The appointment is for a full-time two-year position as a research assistant, with applicants expected to have a doctorate or similar postgraduate qualification.

 

Unusually for an Oxbridge academic post, the job specification says expertise in crowdsourcing is “highly desirable” to feed into reports and workshops on the college’s past, including those alumni who benefited from its colonial links.

 
“Although, unlike the universities of the US, we believe that the colleges of Oxford did not own enslaved people, several undoubtedly benefitted from the largesse of those who did,” the application states.
 

“Many of the objects displayed in university museums and some of those owned by the colleges had their origins essentially as loot, stolen from their indigenous owners.

“Oxford in general helped to educate and train colonial administrators; missionaries; apologists for and critics of empire; and significant leaders and creators of newly independent states.”

 

The researcher is expected to investigate the connections between the college and colonialism, including donations to St John’s from the alumni who served in the empire. One result is to be a report on St John’s colonial past, followed by a series of workshops to discuss the findings and plan the college’s responses.

 

The post is to be funded by the college. St John’s is the wealthiest Oxford college measured by endowments, with more than £500m in assets. Its former students include Tony Blair.

 

Last year Oxford’s All Souls College added a memorial plaque commemorating the slaves who worked on plantations in Barbados. The funds from the plantation were left to the college by a former fellow and were used to build the college’s library.

 

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Harvard Exhibit Weighs in on History of Colonial Measurements 

Harvard Exhibit Weighs in on History of Colonial Measurements  | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it
 

Maps, scales and other tools tell of Europeans’ attempts to make sense of race, geography and the novel plants and landscapes in the New World.

 

October 20, 2024 More than 2 years ago
 
2 min
93
 
A 1960 photograph shows a “body box" used to measure lung capacity. A person would sit inside the box with their head in the glass dome and breathe into the tube at the front of the dome. (Courtesy of the Warren Anatomical Museum and the Archives of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health/Department of Environmental Health)
By Erin Blakemore

Weights, measures and classification systems may seem like innocuous ways of taking stock of the world around us. But the tools are anything but objective, a new exhibition suggests.

Measuring Difference, opening Oct. 20 at the Collection of Historical Scientific Instruments at Harvard University, looks at the history of measurement during and after European colonization of the New World from the 15th century to the present. It shows how European colonists used measurements to quantify and explain their new discoveries — justifying everything from worker exploitation to eugenics along the way.

 
 

The exhibition uses historical artifacts from the museum’s collection and a variety of loaning institutions to tell the story of colonial measurements. Maps, scales, surveyors’ tools, rulers and specimen jars make up just a few of the objects on display.

 
 

All tell a tale of Europeans’ attempts to make sense of race, geography and the novel plants and landscapes they discovered on their travels — and hint at ways settlers used those measurements to master the world around them.

 

The human urge to quantify and compare is well documented in the exhibition, which looks both at scientific tools and complex systems of measurement in a variety of contexts. Ultimately, the exhibit suggests, the biases and beliefs of the person conducting the measurement are as important as the measurements themselves.

 

“Often, it is measurements that help us explain or grasp the world around us, but measures, contrary to what we believe have not always been standardized, nor are they objective,” Gabriela Soto Laveaga, guest curator of the exhibition and a professor of the history of science at Harvard, says in a news release. “What and how we measure reflects what we value in our society.”

 

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Harvard Endowment, Criminal Justice, and Settler Colonialism

Harvard Endowment, Criminal Justice, and Settler Colonialism | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

 

Settler Colonialism

I commend Harvard for adopting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism [Read a full report at harvardmag.com/antisemitism-lawsuit-settlement-25.]

 

The IHRA [definition] is intended to help people understand when legitimate criticism of Israel—which it does not preclude despite false claims otherwise—devolves into calumny intended to defame and delegitimize the national liberation movement of the Jewish people.

 

If Harvard is to stamp out antisemitism on its campuses, then it must not only adopt but also implement the IHRA [definition]. Harvard has an opportunity do just that in response to the letter of Leila Kawar ’98 in the March-April issue (page 6). Kawar states Israel has committed a “documented genocide in Gaza” alongside “its escalating decades-long crimes of apartheid.”

 

She refers to “the horrific crimes being committed by the Israeli settler-colonialist regime.” According to the IHRA, examples of antisemitism include “denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor” and “drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.”

 

Accusing Israel of committing apartheid and genocide, as Kawar has, falls squarely within the IHRA definition of antisemitism. Harvard should disclaim this letter if its adoption of the IHRA [definition] is to have meaning.

 

Benj Pollock, M.B.A. ’79
Seattle, Wash.

Editor’s note: The magazine is editorially independent of the University, and in that spirit published both the excerpt from Adam Kirsch’s book on the subject (January-February, page 47) and Kawar’s response to it.

 

In the January-February issue, as it does every issue, this magazine featured an excerpt from a new book by a Harvard author, the well-respected critic Adam Kirsch ’97. In her letter to the editor Leila Kawar ‘98 is appalled that the magazine would publish something that she happens to disagree with; at the very least the editors should have included a “disclaimer.”

 

In a classic act of projection, she accuses Kirsch of attempting to “shut down…scholarship” by interrogating dominant ideas about settler colonialism. Ironically, her letter perfectly illustrates Kirsch’s thesis that settler colonialism has become an “ideology,” a concept whose proponents believe cannot be subject to critical inquiry—when such inquiry is, of course, a core purpose of the University.

Cecile E. Kuznitz ’89
New York City


I could not agree more with Leila Kawar’s letter titled “Settler Colonialism,” which was published in the March-April issue (page 6). To the qualified analysts whose work I am familiar with, settler colonialism is the correct label for the historical and current practices of the state of Israel in relation to the Palestinians.

 

Settler colonialism means that the indigenous population of a (non-Western) country is (to be) replaced by the colonizing population; that is, the indigenous population is to be maximally removed (ethnically cleansed) from their own land to make room for the incoming colonizers. In fact, there are now somewhat over seven million Israeli Jews and somewhat over seven million Palestinians living in the land between the river and the sea.

 

Of course, between the two populations, there actually exists a huge power imbalance, with Israel committing the “crimes of apartheid and illegal occupation” against the indigenous population over decades (see Kawar).

 

Since October 2023, almost 17 years into its illegal, disabling siege of occupied Gaza, and initially in response to the Palestinian attacks of October 7, Israel has been conducting an accelerated campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Gaza; more recently, it has also ramped up its ethnic cleansing campaign in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem).

 

These campaigns have the full backing (rhetorical, financial, military) of the Trump administration. Israel’s agenda of ethnic cleansing in Gaza was confirmed again by its blocking of all humanitarian aid into Gaza as of March 2, in addition to the blocking of electricity into Gaza as of March 9, reducing the availability of clean water to one-tenth of the residents. The clear message is that staying in Gaza is an inescapable death sentence.

A related topic is the significant phenomenon of student protests since at least last spring at U.S. universities, Harvard being one of them.

 

Without pursuing that topic here, I will only note that in January 2025 Harvard officially adopted the IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) definition of antisemitism, which blurs the distinction between criticism of Jews or Judaism and criticism of the state of Israel. Harvard Magazine reported on Harvard’s adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism in February. This position pertains to the University’s past and future response to “pro-Palestinian” student protesters who demonstrate their moral opposition to Israel’s genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians.

Elizabeth G. Burr, Ph.D. ’96
Saint Paul, Minn.

 

Leila Kawar’s letter decries Adam Kirsch’s questioning the concept and analytical methods of “de-colonial scholarship,” specifically as applied today to Israel. In so doing she attempts to support her argument by saying that the concept of settler colonialism is “now well-established in the scholarly literature.” Well, perhaps. But then the wheels start to come off.

 

Kawar makes it clear that her goal is not so much to defend scholarly analysis as to attempt to portray as a fact that Israel is a committer of (in her words) “horrific crimes.” She accepts that Israel is (again in her words) a “settler colonial regime” and goes on to declare it guilty of “documented genocide” in Gaza, and of decades-long apartheid.

 

She offers no foundation for these accusations—unsurprising, because there is none.

Israel’s antagonists have chosen to accuse Israel of “genocide,” which in the modern context relates to the experience of the Jews of Europe during World War II, knowing the emotional impact it will have.

 

But the few who trouble to look beyond the signs and chants spewed by demonstrators will find that, because Israel cares about minimizing harm to civilians, the ratio of civilian-to-combatant deaths among Gazans is the lowest in any modern conflict. This is despite challenges never before faced by an army—a battlefield in a densely-populated urban setting and an enemy that deliberately places civilians in harm’s way.

 

As for “apartheid,” anyone who has walked on Israeli streets, shopped in the malls, used public transportation, read the highway signs, or followed the parliamentary debates will know how ludicrous this accusation is. I would refer the reader to Shraga Simmons’s book David & Goliath (p. 358) for a convenient citation of examples.

 

I must assume that Kawar has never visited Israel and that her accusations reflect uncritical ignorance. If she has, however, then something more sinister is afoot.

Richard Laub
Buffalo, N.Y.

 

I wish to respond to Leila Kawar’s lack of scholarship and bias. Whether born in Michigan or not, she is an example of a settler colonialist, as am I, living in Pennsylvania near a street named Lenape Ave.

 

Israel may be an example, too, but at least the Zionists have an historical claim to their imperfect homeland.

Her claims of genocide and apartheid are patently biased; her claims to scholarship and documentation are questionable. I wonder why, for instance, Kawar does not focus on the kingdom of Jordan.

 

In controlling the Palestinian Mandate after World War I, England awarded a great majority of that “Palestinian” land to the Hashemites, not the Palestinians. Where is her complaint? Furthermore, in controlling the West Bank until the 1967 war, the Jordanian Hashemites expelled most of the Jews—all of the Jews from Jerusalem, in fact—where is her attention to genocide and apartheid there?

 

Then of course there is the expulsion of many thousands of Jews from Arab lands after 1948. No concern there either? Zionism and Israel appear to be uniquely worthy of blame.

Settler colonialism is certainly nuanced and complex, but presenting Adam Kirsch’s work on it was certainly warranted.

Susan Dyshel Sommovilla ’70
Elkins Park, Penn.

 

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Unlocking Harvard's Ties to Slavery Through Descendant Research

On his PBS series, Finding Your Roots, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. shows how we’re shaped by the ancestors on our family trees — ancestors known and unknown. In his day job, Gates is the Alphonse Fletcher University Professor at Harvard University and a member of the Advisory Council of the Harvard & the Legacy of Slavery Initiative — helping to guide the University’s efforts to uncover its historic ties to the institution of slavery.

Gates joins genealogist Lindsay Fulton, chief research officer at American Ancestors, and Sara Bleich, vice provost for special projects at Harvard and leader of the Harvard & the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, to explain how researchers uncover the names of individuals enslaved by Harvard leaders or who labored on Harvard’s campus between 1636 and 1865.

In 2022, Harvard researchers partnered with American Ancestors to undertake the complicated and painstaking task of poring through records like wills, journals, letters, land deeds and property, marriage, and church records to identify these enslaved individuals. The most recent data shows about 1,600 names. As this data grows over time, it will help advance Harvard’s efforts to help descendants recover their family histories. This is just one way that Harvard is working to reckon with its history of slavery.

More information about this work is available at https://bit.ly/49eBftB.
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Why are Harvard’s Slavery Researchers Quitting or Being Fired? | Race | The Guardian

Why are Harvard’s Slavery Researchers Quitting or Being Fired? | Race | The Guardian | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

 

Michela Moscufo
Sat 18 Apr 2026 11.00 BST

 

Christopher Newman remembers seeing campus police officers as he walked into a human resources office at Harvard University, but he didn’t imagine that they were there for him.

It was July 2024, and Newman had just turned in the results of a two-month-long internship with the Harvard University Archives: an annotated bibliography for the landmark 2022 Harvard and the Legacy of Slavery Initiative report, which detailed the university’s ties to slavery across three centuries. He completed his project on Friday, 26 July, and on Monday, he said he received an email that HR wanted to meet with him.

After that meeting, the officers escorted Newman out of the building, told him he was banned from campus and denied his request to collect his belongings from his office, he told the Guardian. He said he was told that a flight back home was booked for that afternoon. “I was asking too many questions,” Newman said, “veering off of the proverbial beaten path.”

 

Newman knew he had ruffled some feathers during his internship. At an event at a local history museum, he had met members of the Lloyd family – descendants of people enslaved by a Harvard benefactor and trafficked from Antigua to Cambridge, Massachusetts – and struck up an acquaintance. Over the course of several meetings with library staff and other interns after meeting the Lloyds, Newman said he brought up the island of Antigua multiple times.

 

“There is an absolute direct connection from Antigua and what was going on there to the slave trade at Harvard,” he said he told the group. “We should really start looking into this Antigua thing, because there’s some teeth here.” But he was met with radio silence. “It seemed like nobody was really trying to hear that,” he said.

 

In its 2022 report, the university had broadly delineated its historical ties to the Caribbean islands of Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti, Cuba and Jamaica, among others, mainly by tracing the actions of key alumni who were merchants and planters. What Newman was suggesting, though, was that the university look to the present and consider its current-day responsibilities to nations such as Antigua and Barbuda.


In 2022, Harvard’s $100m investment in reparations-related programs seemed to usher in an era of openness and accountability within the university about its legacy of slavery – but academics, both former and current, allege otherwise. 

 

Harvard, founded in 1636 in Cambridge, is widely considered the most prestigious university in the US, and has an endowment of over $50bn, which makes it the wealthiest university in the world. The revenue from the endowment, supplemented by donations, income from student tuition and sponsorships, is used to fund the university’s operations. Yet because the money is invested and meant to grow over time, the university maintains that its ability to draw from the endowment is limited.

 

Still, the school’s’s $100m investment in reparations-related programs in 2022 seemed to usher in an era of openness and accountability within the university about its legacy of slavery. Yet academics involved in the project and related research initiatives allege otherwise. Three Harvard-affiliated academics stepped down from their posts with the Harvard and the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, alleging the university was getting in the way of their work.

 

The former executive director of the initiative stepped down for “personal reasons”, and 10 researchers who had been working on projects related to the initiative had been fired. Two professors wrote in a letter published by the Harvard Crimson that the university had tried to “delay and dilute” efforts to connect with descendant communities while designing a memorial on campus. In a statement made to the student newspaper at the time, a university spokesperson said it would “take seriously the co-chairs’ concerns about the importance of community involvement”.

Newman, 45, is originally from Ohio and a doctoral student at

 

Howard University, specializing in African diaspora and Caribbean studies. His demeanor is calm and soft-spoken, and during interviews, he takes pains to be precise and methodical. His Harvard summer internship responsibilities were to create an annotated bibliography using sources from the Harvard libraries, but there was a wider initiative going on at the university to research its ties to slavery. He said his adviser promised to convey his interest in engaging descendant communities. Yet at the meeting with human resources, Newman said he was fired.

 

He said he was accused of misrepresenting himself online as an archivist and reaching out to descendant communities when he shouldn’t have. Newman added that he only ever claimed he was “working for the Harvard archives”, not employed as an archivist.

A spokesperson for the university said they did not comment on personnel matters yet added “this individual was an intern at Harvard Library, and not with the Harvard & the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, which is the only group at the University authorized to engage in descendant research, descendant outreach, or additional research on behalf of the University.”

 

Newman doesn’t contest that his research interests were expanding past the original job description, but he said he thought his curiosity about living descendants and the university’s ties to the Caribbean would have been encouraged. To be fired for a set of allegations after he tried to defend and explain himself, he said, was painful.

 

The ties between Harvard University and the Caribbean are myriad and consist of densely layered networks of wealthy families, trade, political power and violence. Dozens of university presidents, overseers (governing officials), donors and staff grew their wealth off of enslaved labor and the transatlantic slave trade.

 

Researchers who have attempted to make the university’s connections – and potential obligations – to the Caribbean explicit say their efforts have been stymied. Officials in Antigua have tried to engage in a dialogue with the university about reparations for nearly a decade. “The conversation is not happening,” said Carla Martin, a Harvard lecturer in the African and African American Studies department. “We all have tried.”

 

In the tumultuous years since the creation of the Harvard and the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, three memorial committee members have stepped down and researchers have been fired largely over disputes related to engaging descendant communities.

Vincent Brown, a history professor at Harvard, stepped down from his role on the initiative last winter, after a research team visiting Antigua was unexpectedly fired. “I felt like I was basically sacrificing my scholarly reputation to stay on a project that didn’t have scholarship as its priority,” he said. The university declined to comment on Brown’s resignation.

 

“I have been bombarded with questions that I cannot answer,” he wrote in his resignation letter. “Is it true that the university does not really want to know the whole truth about its history of slave ownership in the Caribbean?” And if true, what would the university be trying to hide?

‘Soe infinite is the profitt of sugar’


It was the winter of 1641, and John Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and one of the founders of Harvard University, was nervous about the economic viability of the colony. Attempts to create a codfish industry and expand the fur trade had failed, and a solution was desperately needed to prevent a crisis. “The general fear of want of foreign commodities, now our money was gone,” he wrote in his journal, “set us on work to provide shipping of our own.”

 

The growing plantations in the Caribbean provided the answer. Winthrop was aware of the “great advantages supposed to be had” in the southern expanses of the British empire, where, a friend in Barbados would inform him: “Men are so intent upon planting sugar that they had rather buy foode at very deare rates than produce it by labour, soe infinite is the profitt of sugar.” The potential gains from planting and processing sugarcane were so great, in other words, that colonists ignored any other form of agriculture entirely.

 

The Caribbean colonies would need to import their food and other necessary products from New England.

Shipments began to leave Boston for the Caribbean with commodities such as grain, fish, cattle and pipe staves, the wooden slats used to make barrels. Boats returning from the Caribbean brought back indigo, sugar, tobacco, cotton and the first recorded enslaved African people to be sold in New England. Within a few years, Winthrop could triumphantly claim that “it pleased the Lord to open to us a trade with Barbados and other islands in the West Indies.” Boston’s role in a transatlantic trade was cemented.

 
A painting of John Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and one of the founders of Harvard University. Photograph: Heritage Images/Getty Images

This development provided a lifeline to the struggling Harvard College, which at that point in 1641 had consisted of two buildings, one still unfinished, on a cow pasture. The university was reliant on financial support from the colonial government and the generosity of individuals, so as the colony flourished on the back of the transatlantic trade, so did the college.

 

One of the largest donations made in the early years of the college came from the Caribbean: a group of colonists who had recently arrived in the Bahamas to develop plantations and enslave Indigenous people gave a gift of local dyewood. This offering, coordinated by an early Harvard graduate, sold for the equivalent of more than $20,000 in today’s dollars and enabled the college to expand to a third building.

 

The transatlantic economy, and subsequent enrichment of the college, began with Indigenous land dispossession, murder and enslavement. In the 1630s, Winthrop had overseen the massacre of at least 700 Indigenous people during the so-called Pequot war. He enslaved at least seven people for his own use and distributed others among friends, a group which included at least three fellow Harvard leaders and benefactors – letting them choose their favorites.

 

Winthrop began trafficking humans even before moving to the New World. His son Henry was part of the first British settlement in Barbados in 1627, three years before the elder Winthrop would sail across the Atlantic, and wrote to his father asking for people to work on his tobacco plantation. Winthrop procured two children, writing in a letter that he “knew not what to do for their binding”, because they were too young “to walk or write”.

 

Enslaved people were becoming the currency of a massive game of quid pro quo stretching across New England, Europe and the Caribbean, where family and alumni ties operated as de facto business networks. When Winthrop’s son Stephen went on a trading mission to Bermuda in 1638, for example, he carried with him a letter of introduction from Hugh Peter, a fellow colonist and member of Harvard’s board of overseers.

 
In the 1630s, Winthrop had overseen the massacre of at least 700 Indigenous people during the so-called Pequot war. Photograph: Stock Montage/Getty Images

In his book Sugar and Slaves, the late historian Richard Slator Dunn calculates that by the late 17th century, at any given time nearly half the trading ships in the Caribbean were from New England and more than half of the ships in Boston were involved in the West Indian trade. “It was a deeply integrated economic space,” said Sven Beckert, a Harvard historian. “But the rich part, the dynamic part of this space, was in the Caribbean, not [Boston].”

‘I see our people getting rich’


Antigua is only 100 sq miles large – a “small place” in the words of Jamaica Kincaid, the Antiguan novelist and Harvard professor, yet at the height of its colonial period, it was covered with more than 200 sugar plantations. The remains of these plantations, large stone mills used to grind sugar, still dot the landscape “like freckles”, as Agnes Meeker, a local historian, puts it.

 

In the 17th century and through the beginning of the 19th century, at least six different plantations in Antigua were owned by early Harvard benefactors or leaders who, in sum, enslaved at least 362 people and potentially more than 600 people, according to estimates produced by Richard Cellini, an independent researcher, and his team before they were fired. Cellini, who had been hired by Harvard to identify enslaved people tied to the university and their descendants, had travelled to Antigua last January along with a group of researchers. Upon their return, the entire team was fired without explanation, though Cellini believes the university was afraid because they had found “too many slaves” and could be bankrupted as a result, he told the Guardian last year.

 

Sarah Kennedy O’Reilly, university spokesperson, disputed Cellini’s statement, saying that no such instruction had ever been issued. “There is no directive to limit the number of direct descendants to be identified through this work,” she wrote.

 

John Winthrop’s youngest son, Samuel, arrived in Antigua in 1649 as one of the first four planters to settle permanently on the island. He had first tried to work as an agent and clerk for different trading companies in the Canary Islands before sailing to Antigua. “I have no fixed calling, not knowing what profession I should embrace,” a young Samuel complained to his dad, but he knew he wanted to make money. “I see many of our people daily growing rich and raising themselves from nothing,” he writes. He decides to go to the Caribbean, where the chances of getting rich are highest.

Samuel dropped out of Harvard before graduating, but he was an important benefactor. Before leaving Boston to begin his career, he and three other students made the first property donation in the university’s history in 1645: land which is now the site of Widener Library.

 

Within a decade of settling in the West Indies and beginning to enslave people, his plantation was producing tens of thousands of pounds of sugar annually for export. Almost all available land on Antigua was used to cultivate sugar, and the island was quickly transformed into a devastating slave society. Infant mortality rates were high, torture was used as a method of domination and enslaved people were frequently worked to death in order to produce the valuable commodity of sugar. Colonial rule and enslavement were routinely met with resistance, uprisings and organized attempts at rebellion.

 

In addition to helping create the island’s planter class, he was a staunch advocate of expanding trade, gave away hundreds of acres of land to settlers and served as the lieutenant governor of Antigua. By the time he died, he was one of the wealthiest men on the island, enslaving 64 people on a 1,000-acre plantation called Groton Hall, named after his birthplace in England, and owning one-quarter of the island of Barbuda.

 

He was reliant on “our New England friends”, as he told his father, to do business. In the Caribbean, wealth was concentrated through the intermarriage of a small number of planter families and alumni networks that facilitated business deals. Antiguan-born Thomas Oliver, who would go on to become a Harvard overseer and the lieutenant governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, built a mansion in Cambridge from wealth derived from the Caribbean. It is now the residence for Harvard University presidents, Elmwood.

 
The ties between Harvard University and the Caribbean are myriad and consist of densely layered networks of wealthy families, trade, political power and violence. Photograph: Bloomberg/Getty Images

Just ‘a PR measure’


When Caitlin DeAngelis was hired by Harvard in 2017 to produce a report for the precursor to the Harvard and the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, the independent researcher found the names of more than 200 people who were enslaved at Oliver’s plantation in Antigua, including a 15-year-old boy named Richard Oliver.

 

She shared the source material with her supervisors, clearly showing the number of enslaved people along with their names, yet none appear in the final version of the Harvard and the Legacy of Slavery report, which claims the number is unknown. DeAngelis believed a decision was made to omit the names, using a technicality: the census of the estate was taken two years after Oliver died, though he passed ownership to his heirs. A spokesperson for the university said that “the data in the report was carefully researched and sourced, reflecting our best understanding at the time.”

 

“They tend to limit the number of people that they acknowledge, rather than to read the historical record in a way that is expansive and more accurate,” she said. “It’s definitely evasive.” As of the report’s publication in 2022, the university had identified 41 Harvard enslavers and at least 70 enslaved people with ties to the university. By the time Cellini was fired in January 2025, his team had identified more than 900 enslaved people and nearly 500 living descendants – a number Cellini estimated could be about 10,000. The latest figures released by the university say the school has identified 1,314 formerly enslaved people and 601 living descendants, as of February.

 

DeAngelis said while she was a researcher at Harvard and teaching courses, the president’s office told her directly not to discuss her ongoing research with students, and that a course she was teaching called “Slavery at Harvard” was changed in the course catalogue to include a focus on abolition without her consent. A spokesperson for the university declined to comment.

“My understanding of Harvard’s orientation towards its research was that it was a PR measure to limit both publicity and legal liability,” DeAngelis said. “My job was not to use all of my skills as a historian to uncover the historical truth. My role was to hold down a desk that allowed Harvard to mislead the press about how serious they were about making reparations and confronting centuries of profiting from slavery.”

 
Dozens of Harvard University presidents, overseers (governing officials), donors and staff grew their wealth off of enslaved labor and the transatlantic slave trade. 

 

This fall, DeAngelis and a group of scholars including Martin, the lecturer, published a report sponsored by the National Park Service about Black families enslaved by Harvard-affiliated families in Cambridge, Antigua and Jamaica. When multiple team members tried to connect with the Legacy of Slavery Initiative, given the obvious overlap in research and looking for some guidance from the university, they were shrugged off, according to Martin. “We were not surprised,” she said. “It was more or less what we expected.”

 

The Legacy of Slavery Initiative is a “window dressing”, Martin said, “more performative than substantive”. As a member of faculty, she admits to struggling with her role and responsibility.

She said: “It remains very opaque to us, what is possible.”

Discounted business development courses


When 30,000 enslaved people in Antigua were emancipated in August 1834, plantation owners were compensated for their “property loss” by the British. The newly freed people were left with nothing, a common story across the Americas. A number of free Black towns were created on the island, but a majority of formerly enslaved people had no choice but to remain on the sites of former plantations.

 

The village of Winthorpe that had been established on the grounds of Samuel Winthrop’s plantation was destroyed in 1942 to make room for a US army base. The people living there were forcibly relocated to what is now the nearby village of New Winthorpes. The late Antiguan poet Mary Geo Quinn, who grew up in that village and referred to herself affectionately as a Winthorpean, was dedicated to preserving the memory of that place.

 

“Lest we forget, tell us again and again about our forefathers strong,” she wrote in one of her poems. “Who toiled for their captors in sun and in rain, And lived to triumph o’er this great wrong.”

 
A photo of the retired Harvard Law School flag with the Royall family crest. The Harvard and the Legacy of Slavery Initiative was a ‘window dressing’, said Carla Martin, a lecturer of African and African American Studies at Harvard University. 

 

Some are less likely to forget than others. When research began to emerge of the Antiguan connection to Harvard, particularly through a family called the Royalls, prominent plantation owners in Antigua whose wealth would create Harvard Law School, the government of Antigua began making demands itself. Coincidentally, Belinda Sutton, also known as Belinda Royall, had been enslaved by the Royall family at their Boston mansion and made one of the first legal cases for reparation in 1783.

 

In 2016, after the university’s decision to remove the Royall family crest as the seal of the law school, Ronald Sanders, Antigua and Barbuda’s ambassador to the US, sent a letter to the then Harvard president, Drew Faust. According to the Harvard Crimson, which first reported the news, he urged the university to “demonstrate its remorse and its debt”. He proposed that the law school could offer annual scholarships for Antiguan students as a form of reparations and suggested in an interview that the university could also offer support, presumably financial, to the University of West Indies, whose campus in Antigua and Barbuda was just being built at the time.

 

Faust’s chief of staff responded to the letter, the Crimson reported, outlining various steps the university had taken internally to address this history. But two years later, Sanders wrote another letter, this time to Harvard’s president, Larry Bacow, reiterating the requests. In 2019, Gaston Browne, Antigua’s prime minister, sent a letter. “We consider Harvard’s failure to acknowledge its obligations to Antigua and the stain it bears from benefitting from the blood of our people as shocking if not immoral,” he wrote, and asked for an official meeting. Bacow replied to Browne a few weeks later, according to the Crimson, reiterating Harvard’s progress and admitting “there is more work to be done.”

 

Within a few months, local press in the Caribbean began to report a potential “programme of cooperation” between Harvard and the University of the West Indies, and that Bacow had signaled a willingness to meet, though a university spokesperson told the Miami Herald at the time the conversations did not involve reparations.

 

In 2021, the University of West Indies announced a partnership with the Harvard Business School: participation in a professional development program that seemingly amounted to discounted online courses. The program is ongoing, and according to Cellini, who travelled to Antigua and met with university representatives, the discount was between 10% and 20%. A spokesperson for Harvard said it “has provided course sharing” for University of West Indies students, yet declined to comment on whether that includes a discounted rate.

 

A spokesperson for the Antiguan government said that the “tacit agreement” in 2021 was that Harvard would provide a number of “incentives” to the University of the West Indies, including some form of scholarships, visiting professors, and that the school would receive help designing its curriculum. The word reparations, he said, was explicitly avoided.

 

Official and unofficial reparations requests from Antigua that emerged during and after Cellini’s visit have included scholarship programs, providing funds to upkeep National Archives, requests for genealogical research support (to identify descendants of people enslaved on plantations), and requests to fund non-communicable diseases research. To date, the discounted business development courses are all that have been offered by the university.

 

A Harvard spokesperson said that since 2019, the university had “pursued and expanded partnerships” with the University of West Indies at Five Islands and that in addition to the online courses, “faculty from both institutions have participated in conferences and programs hosted by each institution.”

 
A portrait of the Royall family, prominent plantation owners in Antigua whose wealth would create Harvard Law School. Photograph: Alamy

Disappointment and disapproval

When Cellini and his team were fired last winter, Sanders, the ambassador to the US, wrote a letter that expressed his disapproval and requested that the research into Harvard’s legacy of slavery continue. Brown, the Harvard history professor, had travelled to Antigua with Cellini shortly before he was fired. Brown wrote in his resignation letter: “In my view, Harvard’s historic relationship with Antigua should be something that the university rediscovers and nurtures for itself, not one left to a business partnership with an external concern,” referring to the university’s decision to entrust a private genealogy organization with the descendant research.

 

“I want to know that if I’m working as a historian on this, that I’m going to be able to do my work, and seeing that this initiative did not have the kind of support that I thought it had when I first joined, best indicated to me that my energy would probably spend better someplace else.”

 

This summer, Brown will be stepping down from his role at Harvard and moving to Yale. “I have loved teaching these students; I have wonderful colleagues here; and Harvard has generously supported my career at every stage,” he said. “But now, when a searching critical approach to the past and its legacies is more important than ever, I believe that Yale’s current leaders are more strongly committed to the health of the historical profession.” Founded in 1701, Yale’s history of Indigenous displacement and genocide and wealth accumulation through enslavement and the plantation economy roughly mirrors Harvard’s.

 

Newman, who is now in his final year at Howard completing his doctoral thesis, was initially afraid to speak out about his experience at Harvard because of potential legal or reputational retribution but affirmed that he did nothing wrong. “I was absolutely passionate,” he said. “I was very diligent in my research and in my work.”

 

He had been hired as part of a diversity initiative to “cultivate the next generation” of researchers and librarians from underrepresented backgrounds, but Newman said he was fired for false accusations, and the work he did for Harvard remains unpublished.

 

“It was very triggering for me on various levels,” he said, “particularly with the presence of the police and just how everything happened so abruptly.” But the lingering feeling a year and a half later, he says, is disappointment. “There was a great opportunity for Harvard to really be involved with the outside community,” he said. “They turned their backs.”

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  • This article was amended on 21 April 2026. A previous version said there were 11 fired researchers who had been working on projects related to the initiative and that Carla Martin was a Harvard professor. There were 10 fired researchers, and Martin is a lecturer.

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The Constitution of American Colonialism

The Constitution of American Colonialism | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

For my part I am not prepared for citizenship in the United States. I do not want it. . . . It takes greed of gain to make a successful citizen of the United States.

— Walter Adair Duncan, father of the Cherokee social welfare system, in Statehood (1893)1

Thus far [I’ve written] of the dependencies whose population is in a sufficiently advanced state to be fitted for representative government; but there are others which have not attained that state, and which . . . must be governed by the dominant country . . . .

— John Stuart Mill in Considerations on Representative Government (1861)2

Introduction

The United States holds hundreds of governments in subordination. Not historically. Today. It dominates these governments and their peoples, exploits their resources, prohibits political independence, withholds representation, and imposes its own laws, values, and norms upon these governments without consent.

 

Mere decades ago, the United States forcefully sterilized citizens of these nations and removed a quarter or more of Native children from their families.

 

At the same time, the Supreme Court stripped these governments of the ability to police crimes in their own communities, unleashing widespread sexual violence and leaving more than one in three Native women vulnerable to rape.

 

Just over a hundred years ago, the United States invaded these nations and held them under decades of martial law before unilaterally appointing civil governments.

 

It ran detention camps on the lands of these governments and forced their children into boarding schools that promised to “[k]ill the Indian in [them], and save the man.”

 

Federal agents beat Native children in such schools for speaking Native languages, held them in unsanitary conditions, and forced them into manual and dangerous forms of labor.

 

Thousands died. Federal law also criminalized political and spiritual practices and outlawed traditional marriage and family structures.

 

In the last two hundred years, the United States has engaged in campaigns of mass execution  and slaughter against citizens of these governments to a level that many have called genocide.

 

But we do not consider these problems to be problems of constitutionalism. We do not invoke this history when considering questions of good governance, citizenship, representation, the ideal design of our governing institutions, or the best distribution of power across the national government and within “our federalism.”

 

Constitutional scholars rarely discuss the problem of American colonialism at all. We lack the very language to confront these problems in a constitutional register. Our common parlance of rights, equality, and integration fails us. Our antisubordination discourse runs out. The limits of our constitutional language are seemingly the limits of our world.

 

Instead, we call the component parts of American colonialism sui generis.

 

We banish each to its silo. The United States did not engage in a structured and mass campaign to remove, detain, assimilate, and destroy these governments and their peoples in the name of “civilization.” Rather, we have federal Indian law; the law of the territories; foreign relations law; treaty law; the war powers; and the laws of naturalization, immigration, and citizenship.

 

We have the puzzle of Puerto Rico, the fascinating but marginalized question of Native nations, and the forgotten history and ongoing struggles of the state of Hawai‘i.

 

All of these puzzles are seen as so illogical and alien as to withstand theorization, defy understanding, and refuse any common logic. Rather than engage with questions born of American colonialism, we have instead declared these puzzles as beyond our constitutional theory and left them to the “plenary power” of the political branches to solve.29

Yet, these colonized nations and peoples have lived on and continue to shape the government, the Constitution, and the empire we live with today.

I begin this Foreword with the observation that a body of law within the United States comprises the constitutional law of American colo­nialism.

 

Conventional wisdom generally draws a distinction between constitutionalism and empire.

 

A constitution is presumed to serve as the fundamental law of a nation. It is established to set and maintain borders. But it primarily focuses inward on a federalist, but unitary, legal and constitutional culture that aspires to equality, justice, republicanism, and liberal values. In this view, colonialism is constitutionalism’s opposite. Empire is outward-facing and focused not on a nation, but on expansion and conquest. It governs not through consent, but through force. Rather than create a unitary constitutional culture, colonialism fosters legal variation and constitutional pluralism.

 

The distinctions between the United States Constitution and colo­nialism have been overstated. Like many constitutions of empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the United States Constitution had two faces: one for the colonizing polity and the other for the colonized.

 

The United States Constitution with which we are most familiar would govern the colonizing polity. But the Constitution would also provide the national government with the power to govern others, “Indians,” in spaces of liberal constitutional exception. In these spaces, the national government built a constitution of empire: a vast and intricate web of relationships between the central government and those it colonized.

 

Within this outward-facing or “external” constitution,Am erican colonialism has thrived — like the tentacles of an octopus, it constructed colonies and the jurisdictions they inhabit as the borderlands of the United States.

 

These borderlands are simultaneously familiar and foreign to the constitutional framework, subject to its power often without its protections.

 

They are domains and peoples over which the United States has extended its jurisdiction unilaterally, often unlawfully and violently, on the grounds that the peoples within those borderlands require civilization before they achieve self-government. Paradoxically, borderlands are spaces of both subordination and empowerment.

 

They are areas where “universal” rules of liberal constitutionalism apply selectively or not at all to “savages.” But they are also spaces of legal and constitutional pluralism that allow colonized peoples some powers to govern and innovate. Borderlands are where permanent “strangers” to the United States Constitution and their worldviews remain, denaturalizing the seemingly stable borders of empires and nations.

 

We have yet to reckon with the constitution of American colonialism as an aspect of our constitutional law. No doubt there have been benefits to this oversight. Treating the law of American colonialism as fractured and siloed has increased the power of small but well-organized colonized groups within the borderlands to reclaim and reshape the principles, laws, and institutions of American colonialism to their benefit.

 

Lack of visibility has allowed them to work in the shadows, avoiding the backlash and retrenchment seen in areas of race, gender, and LGBTQIA+ constitutional reform.

 

This invisibility would likely be lost if the national public finally began to reckon with American colo­nialism. Avoiding constitutional framing has also allowed Native advocates and their allies to craft limits to American colonialism that defy the logic of United States constitutional law writ large — these limits sound in terms of constitutional structure, rather than rights, and avoid the failures of juricentric constitutionalism seen elsewhere by empowering Congress to tackle the constitutional problems of American colonialism.

 

The consequences of not reckoning with American colonialism include burdens as well. Most relevant for this Foreword, not recognizing the law of American colonialism as constitutional law means that limits on American colonialism may be vulnerable to challenges couched in well-established constitutional discourses, values, and doctrines.

 

Unless we recognize colonialism as a distinctive struggle of fundamental practices, norms, and institutions within our society and recognize discourses around power, self-determination, sovereignty, jurisdiction, and community as a distinctive form of constitutional discourse, we leave the strategies that mitigate the American colonial project at risk of constitutional challenge.

 

We face the deeply ironic situation that the constitutional values we initially elevated to reckon with other constitutional failures — especially the institution of human enslavement and Jim Crow segregation — might be used to further the colonial project today.

 

The Supreme Court put this dynamic in sharp relief this last Term when it upheld in Haaland v. Brackeen a law that purported to respond to the forced separation of Native children from their families and communities.

 

Congress passed the law in 1978 after hearings and investigations revealed that state governments had removed approximately 100,000 Native children in the 1950s and 1960s.

 

The law, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), purported to end this policy by setting substantive standards for state courts when removing Native children from their families, including a preference to place these children with Native citizens and communities and a requirement that state governments attempt to keep Native families together.

 

The law also sought to empower tribal governments by strengthening tribal jurisdiction over family law, family court capacity, and child welfare programs.

 

The Supreme Court upheld the statute. But it did so by declining to reach the thorniest constitutional challenge to ICWA and through a ringing affirmance of the “plenary power doctrine,” which gives Congress “plenary power” over Native peoples.

 

Equal protection challenges to federal Indian law were thus left for another day — keeping alive the threat that “an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C. [Indians]) would be effectively erased.”

 

The result in Brackeen is thus a moment for celebration. But it is also a lesson in how far our elite institutions have yet to go before they might reckon with American colonialism.

This distance was revealed by Brackeen itself — both in the opinion and the course of the litigation. The sole reference to the mitigation of American colonialism as a constitutional value came from Justice Kavanaugh.

 

He struggled in oral argument to articulate the problem in constitutional terms: “So, on the one hand, [this Court considers] the great respect for tribal self-government for the success of Indian tribes with — and Indian peoples with recognition of the history of oppression and discrimination against tribes and people.”

 

Justice Kavanaugh then turned to his vision of the constitutional value on the other side, against which we should balance the value of mitigating American colonialism. His description, in many ways, revealed his preference:

On the other hand, [this Court considers] the fundamental principle we don’t treat people differently on account of their race or ethnicity or ancestry, equal justice under law, I don’t think we would ever allow, as the Court suggested in Palmore in 1984, Congress to say that white parents should get a preference for white children in adoption or that Latino parents should get a preference for Latino children in adoption proceedings. I don’t think that would be permitted under that principle of equal justice that we recognized in Palmore.

 

In its only indirect reference, the mitigation of American colonialism was narrowed to a “respect for tribal self-government” and an amorphous history of “oppression and discrimination,” while the “fundamental principle” of “equal justice under law” included the broader principle that “we don’t treat people differently” on account of race and a specific, recognized doctrinal application in Palmore v. Sidoti.

 

Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately in Brackeen to double down on his concerns over “bedrock equal protection principles” — omitting entirely any mention of colonialism.

 

Brackeen presents an example of the Supreme Court tussling with the mitigation of American colonialism as a constitutional value. It acts as a cautionary prelude to the difficulties presented by future equal protection challenges.

 

In Brackeen, the Court was asked to resolve the constitutional status of a law that was crafted specifically to mitigate paradigmatic dynamics of American colonialism.

 

These dynamics were stark — in the years immediately predating the drafting and passage of the statute, state governments removed twenty-five to thirty-five percent of the next generation of Native nations.

 

To scholars of empire, the removal of children from a colonized nation and forced resocialization of those children in the language, norms, and customs of the colonizing nation are easily recognizable as tools of colonization.

 

Colonized nations cease to exist when stripped of their citizens. Because the United States purports to limit the ability of Native nations to draw new membership from beyond those who are descended from political communities historically recognized by the United States, taking descendant children away finally solves the “Indian Problem.”

 

Rather than identifying the preservation of colonized communities as a constitutional value, the well-established constitutional discourse around “equal justice,” crafted in the aftermath of human enslavement and Jim Crow segregation, drove the legal arguments of advocates and, in turn, framed the issues before the Court.

 

Advocates defending the constitutional status of ICWA assumed a defensive crouch, arguing against constitutional relevance. They argued instead that Native children were uniquely not part of racialized communities, that removal was not rooted in racism, and that federal “plenary” power was, on average, beneficial to Native nations.

 

As an author of one of these briefs, I am free to admit the lie. As I have written elsewhere, “racial hierarchies formed whatever heart imperialism has” and “national power was no panacea for the subordination of Native peoples.” But, again, what other option are we left with when the United States does not seem able to even admit its status as empire, much less reckon with it as a problem of constitutional order?

 

Our founding myth is that we are a “nation of immigrants,” a myth that erases the original, Indigenous inhabitants of North America and those communities brought to these lands in chains — a myth that conceals the countless foreign nations, lands, and peoples over which the United States asserted its power to govern and dispossess, without consent or negotiation and often by force.

 

It is difficult, if not foolish, to attempt to understand American history and the development of the United States without placing the constitution of American colonialism at the center of our constitutional theorization. Constitution, in this sense, takes on at least two meanings. On one hand, colonialism — or the unilateral expansion of jurisdiction over lands and peoples — was itself constituted or built through infrastructure, action, and law. On the other, the American colonial project was founded upon and continues to operate according to a range of highly contested but increasingly consistent fundamental principles.

 

These are principles distinct from those governing the metropole and often inflected with racialized hierarchy as justification for dispossession, exploitation, and elimination.

 

But these are also principles that have been tempered through contestation with borderlands peoples over the last two hundred years. Yet, because we have been unable to face the problematic and racialized doctrines that form the foundations of the constitution of American colonialism, we have abandoned colonialism to the plenary power of the political branches — and even theorized it as being beyond the reach of liberal constitutionalism entirely.

 

Recognizing the external constitution and the American colonial project it has fostered could help us understand that the so-called “plenary power doctrine” is not constitutional law, but the absence of constitutional discourse. Instead, reliance on the plenary power of the political branches obscures the constitutional law, principles, and values of American colonialism that continue to shape our colonial relationships today, without addressing difficult questions of justification.

 

It is an effort to fill the void left by the racialized hierarchy that many used to justify American colonialism and shield us from the difficult constitutional conversations that remain across the seemingly disparate, but ultimately connected “external” constitutional fields of federal Indian law, immigration, the law of the territories, foreign relations law, the treaty power, and the powers of war and exigency.

 

Scholars have long drawn the plenary power doctrine as the common thread weaving together these fields but have puzzled over what we should make of the connection. I argue that the key is American colonialism — a constitution that we have yet to understand and explore.

 

Recognition of this external constitution and the colonial project within it could offer the means to move toward resolution of American colonialism. It could secure past efforts to mitigate the damage of colonialism through quotidian lawmaking and bring much-needed stability to these statutes. Federal Indian law is not alone in facing challenges. Similar constitutional challenges have been raised against the law of the territories, even this Term, calling into question the “plenary power” of the national government to regulate these other colonized peoples.

 

Instead, scholars and jurists should address the constitutional questions presented by American colonialism head on. They should provide distinctive constitutional solutions. Many of these bottom-up constitutional conversations are already underway in the borderlands. Borderlands constitutionalism initially borrowed heavily from the vocabulary of the law of nations — discourses of power, disempowerment, sovereignty, self-determination, development, citizenship, and nationhood.

 

These discourses preserved several principles, including recognition of colonized peoples as political entities, preservation of those communities, support for self-determination, respect for the borders and jurisdiction of colonized peoples, collaborative lawmaking, and principles of nonintervention, that weigh against the imposition of the laws of one people upon another.

Borderlands peoples then began translating these principles into the liberal constitutional discourse of the center — most notably, by advocating for self-government and limits on the unilateral imposition of law without collaboration and consent, as well as respect for diverse legal structures and constitutional pluralism.

 

Because colonized communities have long engaged in their own constitutional discourse, many modern laws of American colonialism reflect the constitutional culture or vernacular constitutionalism of colonized peoples and their advocacy over the past two hundred years — statutes like the Indian Child Welfare Act.

 

Colonized peoples persuaded the political branches to codify their constitutional philosophies into law.

 

Rather than simply limiting or overruling the plenary power doctrine and leaving these constitutional principles unmoored, we should recognize their contribution to our constitutional discourse. Borderlands voices provide a foundation for the constitutional conversation that will replace the plenary power doctrine in the future.

 

This Foreword proceeds in three Parts. The first Part begins to draw the contours of the constitution of American colonialism, starting a conversation about the metes and bounds of a new field and bringing together seemingly disparate threads of law. The second Part offers a rediscovery of our modern borderlands and explores their role in shaping our external constitution and the American colonial project embedded within it, including the vital constitutional limits secured on the American colonial project over time. Part III explores the increasing conflicts between American colonialism and the United States Constitution — most recently and most notably, in the cases of Brackeen, United States v. Vaello Madero, and Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta.

 

It then turns to what could be gained from reckoning with the constitution of American colonialism. The ability to better mitigate American colonialism, I argue, as well as a broader vision of constitutionalism — one that presses beyond the erroneous limit between internal and external constitutionalism toward questions over community formation, expansion, and consent that rest within our constitutional borderlands — would be the result of such a long overdue reckoning.

 

* (Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Ojibwe) Professor of Law, New York University. 

 

This Foreword was written with and for nindinawemaaganidog, especially our Kānaka Maoli relatives who have taught me the meaning of ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono (the sovereignty of the land continues through justice and proper acts). 

 

I dedicate this Foreword to my son, Evan Aaron, and to his children with the hope that they will always know mino-bimaadiziwin: Gagwe-minjimendan apane mii giinawaa aawi Newe miinawaa Anishinaabeg. 

 

Many talented souls tempered this Foreword through the fire of their brilliance, among them Monica Bell, Ben Coates, Adam Cox, Ryan Doerfler, Yaseen Eldik, David Engerman, Sam Erman, Bill Eskridge, Barry Friedman, Abbe Gluck, Sally Gordon, Oona Hathaway, Helen Hershkoff, Hi‘ilei Hobart, Adam Hosein, Dan Hulsebosch, Sam Issacharoff, Kēhualani Kauanui, Emma Kaufman, Paul Kramer, Christina Ponsa-Kraus, Sophia Lee, Daryl Levinson, Martha Minow, Sam Moyn, Erin Murphy, Rick Pildes, Robert Post, Aziz Rana, Dorothy Roberts, Reva Siegel, and Joe Singer. 

 

My sincere thanks for the generous research support of Helen Malley, Erica Liu, Olivia Nohealani Guarna (Kānaka Maoli), Emma Barudi, Ashlee Fox (Cherokee), Justin Cole, Andrew Hamilton, Meghan Gupta (Anishinaabe), David Kerry (Yaqui), Sophie Pu, Kyle Ranieri (Diné), and Talia Rothstein — overseen by Leah Shrestinian. Finally, I owe a great debt to the editorial team of the Harvard Law Review for shepherding this unruly draft toward publication.  Chi-miigwech, Ned Blackhawk (Western Shoshone), gizaagi’in.

 

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THE POLITICS AND POLICIES OF REPATRIATING ARCHAEOLOGICAL SKELETAL MATERIAL: (SAARAH BAARTMAN) A CASE STUDY INTO SOUTH AFRICAs INDIGENOUS PAST

THE POLITICS AND POLICIES OF REPATRIATING ARCHAEOLOGICAL SKELETAL MATERIAL: (SAARAH BAARTMAN) A CASE STUDY INTO SOUTH AFRICAs INDIGENOUS PAST | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

BY
COLETTE PIETERSEN

 

Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of· Arts at the University of Cape Town.

 

October 1997


The financial assistance of the Centre for Science Development
(HSRC, South Africa) towards this reseach is hereby
acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at,
are those of the author and are not necessarily to be
attributed to th·e Centre for Science Development.

 

ABSTRACT


This thesis has two aims. The first is to examine the history
of archaeology in southern· Africa and to trace the development
of calls for the repatriation and return of skeletal material
to indigenous groups. The second examines indigenous group
claims for the repatriation and return of skeletal material
from archaeological institutions in, and outside, South
Africa.


Two case studies form the basis for this inquiry. The first
focuses on the claim of the Griqua National Conference (GNC)
for the repatriation from France of the remains of Saartjie
Baartman, a woman of Khoikhoi descent. The second case study
examines the claim of Adam Kok V and his family for the return
of the remains of their ancestor Cornelius Kok II from the
University of the Witwatersrand Anatomy Department.

 

This thesis also documents the first repatriation ceremony to
take place in South Africa. A case study of Native American
Indian history during the colonial period and development .of
the social sciences at that time provides a comparative
perspective.
Overall questions posed within the context of the discussion
are: what is the position of archaeologists in these situations; what is their relationship with South Africa's indigenous nations and; what does the future hold for the discipline in this regard?


Several research methods were adopted. Formal interviews,
consisting of structured questions, recording and note
taking, formed part of the research methodology. Informal
interviews were unstructured and consisted of note taking
only. I refer to these as primary sources for case studies.
Secondary sources comprise information obtained from
interviews conducted by others. The interviews consist of
material researched and collected in the last two years. 

 

Interview material included in the thesis consists of
information provided by archaeologists and indigenous group
leaders from the Griqua National Conference and the Khoisan
Representative Council. Attendances at occasions such as the
repatriation ceremony of Cornelius Kok II in September 1996,
and the first annual Khoisan Conference in July 1997, were
documented through note taking and photographing.
The case studies form the structure around which the
discussion is based, but I also discuss several related issues, the most important of which is race. Members of indigenous groups such as the GNC, who are claiming Griqua descent, was classified 'Coloured' under apartheid laws. It is from this stratum of the community that calls for indigenous re-identification and empowerment have come. As a result the
histories of Saartjie Baartman and Cornelius Kok II have
political consequences.

Claimants' groups are understood as being regionalist in
structure, wanting access to economic and political resources,
yet wishing to remain within a unitary state. In reclaiming
their (lost' histories, ·indigenous groups have claimed (icons'
of Khoikhoi and San history and have challenged the discipline
that institutionalised their ancestors bodies as tobjects' of
study - archaeology. 

 

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION


... the great anthropological museum collections of Europe and South Africa contain much in the way of skeletal remains of the native populations of the region. The major part of these collections was excavated by archaeologists or amateur naturalists of the last century. The value of the skeletons in teaching us about prehistory is undoubted, and there remains a great deal more that they can teach us. Some of these bones tell us another story, for on the back shelves of some museums lie the last mortal remains of historic San killed in the genocide of the last two centuries in South Africa. Fortunately there are not many, but the tale they tell is one oft heard in the halls of history, from the Judea of Herod's day to the current events in Rwanda. This is the tale of people's inhumanity to one another" (Morris, 1996:67)...

 

file:///C:/Users/Admin/Documents/ALKEBULAN%20INDIGEON/thesis_sci_1999_pietersen%20colette%20mavis.pdf 

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Historical Treaties and Annexation Records for Griqualand West

Historical Treaties and Annexation Records for Griqualand West | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

 

Historical treaties and annexation records for Griqualand West are documented through archival maps and proclamations rather than standard photographic depictions.


The region's legal status changed through milestones like Andries Waterboer's 1834 treaty with the Cape Colony, the 1871 Keate Award (proclaiming British protection), and the subsequent 1877 Griqualand West Annexation Act.

 

Timeline of Key Treaties and Legal Proclamations

 

* 1834 Treaty: The Cape Colony signed a formal treaty with Griqua leader Andries Waterboer, recognizing his territorial rights and sovereignty over the land.


* The Keate Award (1871): Following the massive influx of diamond diggers, conflicting land claims arose between the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and the Griqua. Independent arbitration led by the Governor of Natal ruled in favor of Nicolaas Waterboer, who then petitioned for British protection.


* British Proclamation (October 1871): The territory was officially declared a British protectorate, removing executive authority from the Waterboer council.


* Griqualand West Annexation Act (1877): Passed to absorb the crown colony into the Cape Colony. It was fully implemented on October 15, 1880, securing local representation in the Cape Parliament and legalizing the area's borders.

 

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Zulu monarchy land engagements and the Section 25 of the South African constitution 

Zulu monarchy land engagements and the Section 25 of the South African constitution  | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it

Abstract

This work is an attempt to highlight some landmarks in how the Zulu descendants engaged the issue of land with the settlers of any time in South Africa. The method of telling as it happened is a way to confront the history and try to find a natural way of rectifying land rights in settings where the customary land tenure system was overturned by the fortress based on the Western ways of land management.

 

Dispossessed people's land tenure situations are unique settings where even international actors have their ulterior motives and large interest and influence in the success of any restorative action or recovery. The study approach of telling it as it happened for the dispossessed, it represents real opportunity for practical and policy reform for the advocacy for restoration of customary land tenure system for everlasting peace.

 

The trail of land handling from King Shaka, King Dingane, King Mpande, Cetshwayo and Dinuzulu is testimony of the trail of blood that went along the succession plan of Kingship which ceased to be hereditary from when King Shaka took over "ngeklwa". The whites became aware of this and they got entangled in it for land. The South African Constitution Section 25 needs auctioning as it permeates expropriation without compensation for land reform.

Key takeaways

AI

  1. Zulu land tenure history reveals continuous conflict with settlers since the 1652 arrival of Europeans.
  2. King Shaka's reign marked significant land loss, reducing Zulu territory from 2.6 million to 3.8 million acres.
  3. The text advocates for restoring customary land tenure systems through Section 25 of the South African Constitution.
  4. Historical alliances between Zulu kings and settlers shaped land distribution and power dynamics in Zululand.
  5. Modern land policy remains contentious, with 70% of land still owned by whites despite post-apartheid reforms.
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Independence and Decolonization in Southern Africa

Independence and Decolonization in Southern Africa | ALKEBULAN INDIGENOUS | Scoop.it
Independence and decolonization in Southern Africa
 
Shula E. Marks
 
Britannica Editors
 
Oct. 16, 2026 •History
 

After the war the imperial powers were under strong international pressure to decolonize. In Southern Africa, however, the transfer of power to an African majority was greatly complicated by the presence of entrenched white settlers.

 

After an initial phase from 1945 to about 1958, in which white power seemed to be consolidated, decolonization proceeded in three stages: first, the relatively peaceful achievement by 1968 of independence by those territories under direct British rule (the High Commission territories became Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became Zambia and Malawi); second, the far bloodier struggle for independence in the Portuguese colonies and in Southern Rhodesia (from 1965 Rhodesia, which achieved independence as Zimbabwe in 1980); and, third, the denouement in South West Africa (which in 1990 achieved independence as Namibia) and in South Africa, where the Black majority took power after nonracial, democratic elections in 1994.

 

While at the end of the colonial period imperial interests still controlled the economies of the region, by the end of the 20th century South Africa had become the dominant economic power. The beginning of the 21st century ushered in attempts to finally create unity among all the countries in Southern Africa. Despite the spread of multiparty democracy, however, violence, inequality, and poverty persisted throughout the region.

The consolidation of white rule in Southern Africa

Paradoxically, World War II and the rise of more radical African political movements initially consolidated white rule in Southern Africa, as evidenced by the victory of the predominantly Afrikaner National Party in South Africa, the creation of the Central African Federation by Britain, and renewed white immigration to the Rhodesias, Angola, Mozambique, and South West Africa. Once again, developments in South Africa dominated the region, although the discrediting of racism in Europe and decolonization in South Asia led to increasing international censure of South African racial policies.

 

Dissatisfaction with the wartime cabinet and fears of urban African militants lay behind the victory of the Reunited National Party (later the National Party [NP]), which ran on a platform of apartheid (“apartness”) in the white elections of 1948. Although the NP won only a plurality of votes, its victory signified a new Afrikaner unity that resulted from 30 years of intense ideological labour and institution building by ethnic nationalists intent on capturing the South African state.

 

Although the various interests in the NP had different interpretations of apartheid, the party essentially had three connected goals: to entrench itself in power, to promote Afrikaner concerns, and to protect white supremacy. By 1970 these goals largely had been achieved. The NP controlled parliament, and many English speakers voted for the Nationalists—despite their declaration of a republic in 1960–61 and subsequent decision to remove South Africa from the British Commonwealth—believing that the NP alone ensured white domination. Economic and educational policies favoured Afrikaners, who became increasingly urbanized and less economically disadvantaged.

 

Under Hendrik Verwoerd, who served as minister of Native Affairs and later as prime minister (1958–66), apartheid took shape. Controls over African labour mobility were tightened, and the colour bar in employment was extended. From 1959 chiefly authorities in the rural reserves (renamed “Bantu homelands” or Bantustans) were given increased powers and granted limited self-government, though they remained subject to white control. Ethnic and racial distinctions among whites, Africans, Coloureds, and Indians were more strictly defined and policed. Although Coloureds and Indians were subordinated to white rule and humiliated by racial discrimination, they nevertheless were privileged in comparison with Africans.

 

Black opposition to apartheid policies in the 1950s was led by the ANC in alliance with other opposition organizations consisting of radical whites, Coloureds, and Indians. In 1955 this Congress Alliance drew up the Freedom Charter, a program of nonracial social democracy. Africanist suspicion of nonracialism and hostility to white Communists, however, led to the formation of the rival Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959. Both organizations were banned after demonstrations against the pass laws in March 1960 at Sharpeville, in which police killed at least 67 and injured more than 180 African protestors, triggering massive protests. Increasingly draconian security legislation, the banning, exile, and imprisonment of leaders (including Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC), and the widespread use of informants resulted in a period of relative political calm in the 1960s.

 

The stability of the 1960s encouraged international investment, and the South African economy became far more centralized and capital-intensive. Economic growth made possible unprecedented social engineering, and the political geography of South Africa was transformed as millions of people were removed from so-called white areas to the Black homelands. Access to welfare and political rights were made dependent on state-manipulated ethnic identities, which assumed new importance with the creation of the homelands. In 1976 the Transkei homeland was given independence by the South African government, and grants of “independence” followed over the next four years to Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, and Venda, though their “independence” was not internationally recognized.

Peaceful independence

Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland

The victory of the overtly republican National Party in South Africa challenged British interests in the subcontinent. The NP’s economic policies appeared to threaten British investments in South Africa at a time when Britain was particularly dependent on its colonial possessions for its sterling balances, while the Nationalists also renewed their demand for the incorporation into South Africa of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.

 

By the mid 1950s it was clear that the three High Commission territories could not be transferred to South Africa and had to be prepared for independence. Limited funds were made available for the provision of social services, education, soil conservation, and infrastructure development, but this assistance did little to reduce the territories’ dependence on migrant labour to South Africa. A partial exception was Swaziland, where British- and South African-owned asbestos and coal mines, sugar and timber plantations, and cattle ranches had begun to generate more local jobs after the war.

 

The independence of the majority of Britain’s African territories put the independence of the High Commission territories in Southern Africa on the British agenda, despite their continued economic dependence on South Africa and the relative weakness of their independence movements.

 

Lesotho, with high levels of literacy, was the first to organize. In 1952 Ntsu Mokhehle formed the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), modeled on the ANC. In 1958 Chief Leabua Jonathan, who was to become Lesotho’s first prime minister, founded the conservative Basutoland National Party (BNP), with the support of the South African government, the powerful Roman Catholic church, and the queen regent. Jonathan led the BNP to a narrow victory in the 1965 elections; Lesotho achieved independence in 1966.

 

In Botswana and Swaziland, modern nationalist movements emerged somewhat later and were dominated by members of the royal families, who were able to perpetuate monarchical domination quite effectively through the ballot box. In Botswana, which achieved its independence in 1966, Seretse Khama—the grandson of the Ngwato chief Khama III—emerged as the first president. In Swaziland, where the presence of white settlers and South African and international economic interests held up full independence until 1968, the Swazi king Sobhuza II emerged as head of state through the overwhelming electoral majority of his Imbokodvo National Movement in the rural areas. Thus, in all three territories conservative governments anxious to avoid provoking South Africa emerged in the first elections after independence.

 

Botswana was undoubtedly the most successful economically and politically and retained the most open political institutions and the most distance from South Africa. Dominated by a modernizing elite, the country’s economy flourished with the expansion of cattle ranching and diamond, nickel, and copper mining. Botswana played a leading role in efforts to coordinate the regional economy. The BCP, with a primarily rural electoral base, ruled Botswana into the mid 1990s.

 

In Swaziland, Sobhuza II in 1973 declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and all political parties, and consolidated his rule after a more radical opposition party showed strength in the 1972 elections. In 1978 a new constitution ensured the continued power of the monarchy in alliance with selected chiefs. This ruling elite used its domination of the state and land to accumulate wealth in close collaboration with foreign (mainly South African) investors. Until the death of Sobhuza II in 1982, all opposition to the government and to its close links with South Africa was suppressed. In the 1980s and ’90s political repression and competition for power within the ruling group intensified.

 

Fears that the more radical BCP would win the 1970 elections in Lesotho led Jonathan, supported by South Africa, to declare a state of emergency, annul the election, and suspend the constitution. Opposition leaders fled, and by the late 1970s chronic warfare had erupted in Lesotho’s northeastern mountains. Through the 1960s and early ’70s Jonathan was South Africa’s most reliable regional ally, but he subsequently became an outspoken critic of South African policies. Jonathan’s authoritarian rule continued until 1986, when he was deposed in a military coup supported by South Africa.

 

The Central African Federation

Alarm at the NP victory in South Africa also stimulated Britain into federating its south-central African territories as a bulwark against Afrikaner nationalism. Even before World War II, Northern Rhodesian whites had begun to consider federation with Southern Rhodesia as a response to growing African assertiveness, and support for federation increased after the war. At the same time, the growing importance of the copper industry in Northern Rhodesia attracted Southern Rhodesian whites to the idea of federation. Wartime collaboration promoted federal ideas among white settlers and in British government circles. It was widely assumed that Southern Rhodesia would provide managerial and administrative skills, Northern Rhodesia copper revenues, and Nyasaland labour for the new entity. Africans in the north, however, feared that federation would prevent political advance and extend Southern Rhodesia’s racist laws. Ignoring African opposition, in 1953 Britain’s Conservative government brought the territories together in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, commonly known as the Central African Federation.

 

Prosperity muted African protest in the early years of federation, although dissent mounted in the impoverished reserves of Southern Rhodesia, where disaffection was fueled by attempts to restructure peasant production at a time of growing landlessness and congestion on inferior land. Despite the rhetoric of multiracial partnership, the economic advantages of federation appeared mainly to benefit Southern Rhodesian whites.

 

Malawi and Zambia

 
First president of MalawiHastings Kamuzu Banda, pictured here in 1960, six years before Malawi became a republic and he became its first president.

By the late 1950s more militant national movements had emerged in the Central African Federation and were attempting to mobilize a disaffected peasantry in all three territories. The emergence of these nationalist movements profoundly disturbed the federal authorities. After sporadic unrest in Nyasaland in 1959 a state of emergency was declared, while in all three territories nationalist leaders were arrested and their organizations banned. The crackdown set off further disorder, and in the northern territories the British were persuaded to move toward decolonization. By 1961–62 the nationalists had been released and new constitutions drawn up, and in 1963 the federation was dissolved. In the following year the Malawi Congress Party under Hastings Kamuzu Banda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) under Kenneth Kaunda won the first universal suffrage elections in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, respectively, and led them into independence as Malawi and Zambia.

 

Banda and Kaunda differed greatly in their relations with the liberation struggles in the rest of Southern Africa. In the hope of gaining control of northern Mozambique, Banda negotiated with the Portuguese and withheld assistance from Mozambican nationalists, who during the 1960s were beginning their military campaign. He also established close ties with the white South African government, which supplied much of Malawi’s direct aid. Malawi thus became the foundation of South Africa’s “outward-looking” foreign policy in Africa.

Although initially Zambia was as tied economically to Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, Kaunda backed the resistance movements there and supported United Nations (UN) sanctions against the white government in Rhodesia. He paid a heavy price. The sanctions closed Zambia’s major trade and transportation routes through Rhodesia, and, although alternate routes were established through Angola and new east-west lines through Tanzania were constructed by the mid 1970s, subsequent armed incursions from Rhodesia and South Africa and continued warfare in Angola and Mozambique disrupted the costly new trade and transportation lines. Zambia’s economy contracted by nearly half between 1974 and 1979, and its collapse was prevented only by intervention from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

 

During the late 1970s Malawi, long believed to have successful rural development policies, also faced economic crisis. The lean years of the 1980s saw a widening gap between rich and poor, which was worsened by Banda’s support of the Mozambican insurgency movement Renamo and the influx of vast numbers of refugees from the civil war in Mozambique.

 

The struggle for independence

 

Angola and Mozambique

White power in Angola and Mozambique remained relatively weak in comparison with South Africa and South West Africa. After the war Portugal sought to maintain its colonies in the face of growing, if still slight, African urban nationalist movements by increasing the settler population dramatically. This was facilitated in Angola by a coffee boom and the discovery of minerals and petroleum and in Mozambique by government-instituted agricultural schemes.

 

These developments brought little benefit to the majority of Africans, however, who continued to work as ill-paid migrant labourers, their upward mobility blocked by settlers. Even in areas of limited fertility, Africans still had to produce their quota of cotton, rice, or coffee; most of the good land was taken over by wealthy white landowners and multinational companies, and the forced labour codes remained in operation until 1962.

The longest, most divided, and bloodiest wars against colonialism in the subcontinent occurred in the Portuguese colonies. War first erupted in Angola in 1961, in a series of apparently unconnected uprisings. The initiative was captured by the urban-based Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola; MPLA), under its poet-president Agostinho Neto. The MPLA was supported by communists in Portugal, the Soviet Union, and Cuba, but its hegemony was contested from the start by Holden Roberto’s National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola; FNLA), based in Congo (Kinshasa), and by Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola; UNITA), supported primarily by Ovimbundu in the south.

 

In Mozambique the nationalist organizations were initially more successfully united. The anticolonial struggle was led by Eduardo Mondlane of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique; Frelimo), which was formed in 1962 by exiles in Tanzania. Internal dissent had been crushed by 1964, and Frelimo launched a guerrilla war against targets in northern Mozambique, claiming to have established its own administrative, educational, and economic networks in the northern districts. Despite the assassination of Mondlane in 1969, a new phase of the war opened in 1971 under the leadership of Samora Machel, and by 1974 Frelimo controlled much of northern and central Mozambique.

Portugal’s initial response to the outbreak of revolt in Angola and Mozambique was all-out war, and by the mid 1960s there were some 70,000 Portuguese troops in each territory. Large numbers of Black troops were recruited, and villagers supporting the guerrillas were subjected to savage reprisals. In a bid to attract international support, Portugal opened the colonies to foreign investment in 1963, and by the late 1960s the regime also instituted modest economic and educational reforms to preempt the nationalists and meet rising demands for a semiskilled workforce. But the reforms were too few and too late, and in April 1974 the sheer cost of the wars—together with rising dissatisfaction with the government in Portugal—led to an army coup, the collapse of the Portuguese government, and Portuguese withdrawal from Africa.

 

When the Portuguese left Luanda in November 1975, Angola was in the throes of a civil war between its divided liberation movements. The war escalated as the United States aided the FNLA-UNITA alliance through Zaire and encouraged a South African invasion of Angola in 1974–75 in the hope of installing a pro-Western government. The Soviet Union supplied weapons to the MPLA, which was aided by Cuban troops. The South African invasion was repelled, but South Africa continued to destabilize the MPLA government over the next 15 years through its covert support for UNITA, which it hoped to install as its client. The MPLA eventually established control of Angola under Neto, but its government was undermined by South African incursions, the flight of most of the settlers at independence, incursions of Kongo peoples from Congo (Kinshasa), hostility from the United States, and its own doctrinaire economic policies.

 

Portuguese withdrawal also led to Mozambique’s independence under a Frelimo government in June 1975, but the flight of skilled expatriates and Mozambique’s proximity to hostile regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia caused immediate problems. The country was severely hit by a drastic cutback in recruitment by the South African Chamber of Mines in 1976 and, like Zambia, paid heavily for obeying UN sanctions against Rhodesia and for supporting the liberation movements. Nevertheless, in the early years of independence, Frelimo abolished many of the most hated aspects of colonial rule and greatly increased the availability of welfare resources for the Black populace. Mozambican territory was raided by Rhodesia and South Africa in 1979, and this was followed by further South African attacks and the infiltration of the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana; Renamo), a brutal insurgency group established by Rhodesian intelligence services in 1976–77.

 

In Mozambique and Angola the unpopularity of the governments’ Marxist policies—including the concentration of the population in communal villages, state farms, and cooperatives and attacks on private property, chiefly authority, and religion—eased the way for South African intervention. During the 1980s both Frelimo and the MPLA lost control outside the main urban areas.

 

Zimbabwe

African liberation in Rhodesia was closely tied to the independence struggles in Mozambique. The election of 1962—boycotted by African nationalists—was won by the extreme right-wing Rhodesian Front (RF) party, which ran on a platform of immediate independence under white control. The Central African Federation was dissolved in 1963. Britain was unwilling to grant Rhodesia independence; in 1965 the RF, under the leadership of Ian Smith, unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent. Under the RF, government policies came even closer to those in South Africa. Although Rhodesia had an ostensibly colour-blind franchise, less than 1 percent of Africans were able to vote. The powers of chiefs were bolstered and discriminatory legislation increased. Despite international pressure, Britain refused to use force against the illegal regime. International economic sanctions were undermined by South Africa, Portugal, and multinational oil companies. White commercial agriculture was heavily subsidized and competed with African peasants, who felt the main burden of the sanctions.

 

The banning of successive nationalist organizations and the detention and exile of their leadership led to fierce infighting and the emergence of two major liberation organizations, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), under Robert Mugabe, and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), under Joshua Nkomo. With Frelimo’s military successes in northeastern Mozambique in 1971–72 and, more important, with the transformation of the power structure in the region after the independence of the Portuguese territories, a new guerrilla strategy began to make headway. Various attempts by the British to resolve the conflict—including a referendum on a new constitution in 1972—all failed, and by the late 1970s the Rhodesian army and the guerrillas pursued the war with increasing ferocity, both sides often intimidating and torturing recruits in the rural areas.

 

By 1978 it had become clear that the Rhodesian government would not win the war, and Smith, under pressure from Western countries and South Africa, agreed in 1978 to allow the internal African opposition to contest multiracial elections the following year. These elections, however, excluded ZAPU and ZANU. Thus, despite the appointment of a Black prime minister, the war continued unabated. In 1979 renewed negotiations in London ultimately led to a peace settlement that established majority rule, and in 1980 Mugabe and ZANU won a landslide electoral victory.

The release of a large number of unemployed, armed young men into the countryside bequeathed a violent legacy, and by 1982 the initial ZANU-ZAPU government coalition broke down in the face of increasing violence in Matabeleland, for which ZANU held ZAPU responsible. Early in 1983 Mugabe sent government forces to punish the people of Matabeleland. Despite the withdrawal of troops and an amnesty in 1988, memories of this brutal counterinsurgency campaign were even more traumatic than recollections of the liberation struggle.

 

The idea of a one-party state was dropped amid calls for reparations for the massacres in Matabeleland and for greater public accountability. Although the early years of Zimbabwean independence were economically promising, with the return of investment as sanctions were lifted and a series of good harvests, much of the white economy and bureaucracy remained intact, and gross inequalities persisted. Despite its revolutionary rhetoric, ZANU (which ruled Zimbabwe into the mid 1990s) seemed more intent on replacing white government with Black than with transforming the lives of the poor.

 

South West Africa

In South West Africa, too, the National Party increased its control in the 1950s and ’60s. Long governed as part of South Africa, in 1949 South West Africa became South Africa’s fifth province, and its white population was swollen by about 3,000 immigrants. The economy grew dramatically, increasing the mobility of Black workers and creating an urban-based Black intelligentsia for the first time. Apartheid was extended to South West Africa, however, and in the mid 1960s its reserves were also consolidated into seven ethnically defined homelands under tribal authorities.

 

The small political associations in South West Africa after the war were profoundly influenced by their South African counterparts, but the first mass organization to protest against South Africa’s policies was formed only in 1958; in 1960 this organization became the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). Launched by Ovambo contract workers, SWAPO came to represent most Black South West Africans in opposing apartheid, racial inequalities, and economic subordination to South Africa. After years of fruitless peaceful protest, SWAPO began a military campaign against the government in 1966.

Although South Africa did not recognize the authority of the UN, the issue of South African rule in South West Africa came before the UN regularly, and in 1966 the UN called for complete South African withdrawal. This decision was upheld by the International Court of Justice at The Hague in 1971. In 1973 the UN appointed its own commissioner for Namibia (as the territory became known in the 1970s); despite the presence of the UN commissioner and the intensification of SWAPO’s military campaign, it was only after Angolan independence in 1975 and increasing international pressure that South Africa’s policies began to change.

 
 

Namibia

The independence of Angola prompted changes in South African strategy toward Namibia during the late 1970s, as South Africa attempted to transform the territory into a quasi-independent buffer against more radical change by proposing complex constitutional arrangements for a transitional government. The strategy, based on the co-option of a local Black elite as a moderate alternative to SWAPO, was intended to placate international opinion while leaving control of Namibia in South African hands and keeping its military options open. The constitutional proposals were rejected by the international community, however, and in 1978 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 435, which set out proposals for a cease-fire and UN-supervised elections. South Africa did not move to implement this resolution, though it had accepted similar proposals earlier.

 

By the second half of the 1980s—in part because South Africa once more had been drawn into invading Angola—the war in Namibia was becoming increasingly costly for South Africa in military, political, economic, and diplomatic terms. A turning point occurred in 1988 when the South African Defense Force’s inability to take Cuito-Cuanavale in Angola revealed South Africa’s lack of superior airpower and its inadequate weapons technology. Under joint pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States, South Africa finally agreed to implement Resolution 435, and democratic elections in 1989 were won by SWAPO, led by Sam Nujoma. In 1990 Namibia finally achieved independence.

 
 

South Africa

The process of decolonization in south-central Africa and the High Commission territories was generally peaceful. By the late 1960s the few remaining nonindependent African countries were all in settler-dominated Southern Africa. The 1970s were a time of escalating wars of liberation in Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The independence of the Portuguese colonies under self-styled Marxist governments was crucial in shifting the balance of power against the remaining white minority states in the subcontinent. International involvement in the region increased, and by 1980 only South Africa and Namibia remained under minority rule.

 

For the territories of Southern Africa, the continuance of apartheid in South Africa shaped the postindependence years; the liberation of these territories in turn inspired and politicized South Africa’s Black populace and transformed the balance of power in the region. In response, P.W. Botha, who became prime minister of South Africa in 1978 and led South Africa until 1989, massively increased defense expenditures and began a low-grade war on the neighbouring states, determined to destroy all ANC bases. At the same time, Botha pursued an internal program of constitutional reform, which strengthened the powers of the state president and increased repression of the Black majority. The South African military assumed greater political importance. South Africa destabilized the region by arming internal dissidents, who attacked schools, clinics, railways, and harbours. This intervention was especially devastating in Angola and Mozambique, but South Africa also destabilized eastern Zimbabwe and raided alleged ANC bases in Zambia, Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho.

 

For all the apparent success of its social engineering policies, by the late 1960s cracks had begun to appear in the National Party’s edifice of control. It subsequently confronted multiple crises, as Black opposition again broke to the surface with the emergence of the Black Consciousness movement in 1968, led by the charismatic activist Stephen Biko. The movement sought to raise Black self-awareness and to unite Black students, professionals, and intellectuals. As Black political activity increased, the apparently monolithic NP began to fragment.

The economy also began to show signs of weakness by the mid 1970s. Inflation climbed steeply and the economy contracted; a reliance on imported technology contributed to a trade deficit. Whites, who constituted a declining proportion of the population, could not meet the demand for skilled and semiskilled labour. The small internal market and African trade sanctions also hampered growth.

 

Yet the economic growth of the 1960s had expanded the Black working class and increased its confidence, and 1972–73 saw a wave of strikes and rapid growth of the trade union movement. In some sectors the labour activism caused African wages to rise more quickly than white wages. Nevertheless, technological innovation led to high unemployment for the unskilled, and urban conditions for Africans continued to deteriorate as impoverished homeland inhabitants defied the pass laws and sought work in town. For them, the fiction of the independence of the homelands came to have a grim reality in the 1980s, as their homeland citizenship restricted their legal access to jobs and housing in the rest of South Africa.

 

The revival of labour activism and the independence of Mozambique and Angola further inspired the Black Consciousness movement. In June 1976 the government’s determination to impose Afrikaans on Black schools provided the flashpoint for prolonged countrywide protests, touched off after police fired on demonstrating students in Soweto (a Black township outside Johannesburg). This event transformed political consciousness beyond the youth—although they remained in the forefront of protest thereafter—with far-reaching consequences. Churches were radicalized, large numbers of community organizations sprang up, and there was a resurgence of support for the banned ANC, particularly among young people. By the late 1970s the ANC had decided to reorganize its underground internally, emphasizing political organization within the country.

 

In response, the government abandoned many aspects of orthodox apartheid: African trade unions were recognized, the pass laws were abolished, and attempts were made to co-opt the African middle and skilled working class (through the granting of limited urban and welfare rights) and to enhance the status of Indians and Coloureds (through constitutional change). The result was to politicize civil society even further, as the state was seen as using welfare for purposes of social control. Government attempts to address problems almost invariably led to fresh confrontations with the alienated Black population.

The reform process had stalled by the mid 1980s, and the state attempted to undermine Black opposition by cultivating conservative African leaders, notably Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, head of the primarily Zulu Inkatha movement in Natal, which became the scene of internecine violence. When F.W. de Klerk ascended to the presidency in 1989, he faced continuing African militancy, international economic and cultural sanctions, renewed economic recession, and intensifying war in Angola and Namibia.

 
 
Nelson MandelaShortly after becoming president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela spoke at a United Nations luncheon, October 1994.

On February 2, 1990, de Klerk announced his intention to free Nelson Mandela, lift the ban on many opposition parties (including the ANC and the PAC), and negotiate with the Black majority for a new, nonracial constitution. Agreement on an interim constitution was reached in 1993, and in April 1994 Mandela was elected president of South Africa.

(Note: This article covered the history of the region from the prehistoric period to the end of the colonial period in the 20th century. Coverage of the region’s physical and human geography can be found in the article Africa. For discussion of the physical and human geography of individual countries in the region and their postcolonial history, see Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.)

 

 

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SA History Updated Version of the KhoiKhoi-Bushman Griqua Indigenous People of Griekwaland West Territory.

Griqua
Published 21 Mar 2011
Updated20 Jul 2026
A-0016814
 

Introduction

 

The arrival of the Boers and the colonial masters to the area known as Griqualand West, denied the Griquas the opportunity of following their own development paths. They lost their land and traditional resources, and were tossed into a sea of rapid social change which saw them lose the independence they had searched for in the Orange Free State area.

 

In the course of the 18th century, new communities defined by race, culture, religion and differential access to land and power began to emerge; they became tied together through the spoken word. One of these communities was the “Bastaards” which referred to offspring of liaisons between Europeans, slaves and Khoikhoi. The term was also used to refer to subordinate Blacks who could speak Dutch, ride and shoot.

 

On White owned farms, Bastaards or Basters, did more skilled jobs such as transport riders and craftsmen. They took these skills with them later into the interior. The term “Bastaards” originally denoted people with a greater “civilisation” and attachment to Christianity than the Khoikhoi or slaves.

 

In the second half of the 18th century, small Baster communities formed in the fringe areas of the northwest and the eastern frontier – Colesberg, Hantam, Roggeveld and Namaqualand. They could speak Afrikaans, had European names and their children were baptised in the church. They were even called up to do commando service. Notwithstanding these facts, they were increasingly being squeezed out from the land they held and they rarely succeeded in winning land claims as burghers invariably had the stronger claim, and better access to the field cornets who reported on any such claims. Basters and other people of mixed race moved first to the outer limits of the colony and then beyond its borders.

 

Origins:

 

The Griquas could trace their forefathers to two clans, the Koks and Barendse, the first made up mainly of Khoikhoi and the second of mixed European descent.

 

A freed slave, Adam Kok, who managed to obtain burgher rights and a farm near the present Piketberg, founded the most vigorous mixed community. According to one tradition, Adam Kok married the daughter of the chief of a Khoikhoi clan, the Chariguriqua, during the 1750’s. He attracted a following as he moved up from Piketberg to Little Namaqualand and by the 1790’s Cornelius Kok, Adams’ son moved out of the colony to the Orange River and then eastwards along the bank to what is now known as Griqualand West. Cornelius had gathered with him a large number of Basters, some Khoikhoi and escaped slaves.

 

Adam Kok, leader of the Griquas at Nomansland. Source: www.tokencoins.com

The two groups, under their respective leaders Cornelius and the brothers Barend and Nicolaas Barends roamed the area around the Orange River until 1804 when they were persuaded by two missionaries from the London Missionary Society to settle down with their followers north of the Orange River.

 

Adam Kok, leader of the Griquas at Nomansland

 

On the insistence of the missionary John Campbell, they came up with the name Griqua. They established a basic system of government based on leaders known as kaptyns and magistrates drawn from the leading families. Prominent families included were the Kok and Barends families, and the Waterboer family complex.

These families maintained stability by taking on a life of raiding and establishing trade links with their neighbours. It was alleged that Andries Waterboer had no White parentage but was a dependent of Adam Kok. Later, he allied himself to the church, acting as an interpreter and rose to influence after 1820 when he was appointed kaptyn. The Griquas attempted to achieve a greater measure of political autonomy by inviting the missionaries to join them.

 

The Griquas founded a settlement called Klaarwater, later known as Griquatown. The Griqua communities were constantly bedevilled with internal divisions and environmental uncertainty. One of the greatest causes of tension was between wanting to be within the colonial fold with its security and economic opportunities versus wanting to maintain independence. The missionaries wanted to Christianise the Griqua which would basically transform them into a settled agricultural and pastoral group. By drawing up a constitution, the kaptyns lost much of their power. Even though this created tension, it accorded the Griqua a degree of respectability while the missionaries offered some protection.

 

Poor relations between Waterboer and the Kok and Barends family complex caused Adam Kok II and Barend Barends to move away from Griquatown with their followers to Cambell and Danielskuil, respectively. Later Barends moved to Boetsap and the Koks to Philippolis. This made Andries Waterboer the dominant Griqua in Griquatown itself and the protégé of the missionaries.

The Griquas were the first people from the Cape to settle in the Transorangia area, beyond the Orange River. Some Griqua raided the Tlhaping, a Tswana speaking community, while others obtained cattle from them which was used to trade with the Cape farmers for firearms, horses and wagons,. The Griqua also acted as middlemen in a lucrative ivory trade between the Tswana and the colony, while others hunted ivory for themselves.

 

The Boers and Griqualand West

 

The Boers arrived in the area of Griquatown after Natal was taken over by the British. They acquired land from the Griqua, buying it in exchange for horses, liquor, firearms and ammunition. Trouble started when Kok arrested a Boer accused of ill-treating his people, and the trekker community tried to take over his entire territory. A British force stationed at Colesberg, quickly crossed the Orange River and defeated the settlers at Zwartkoppies.

Maitland, who was Governor at the time, decided to put an end to the territorial ambitions of the Boers by inventing a complicated system of land tenure whereby each chief’s land would be divided into two parts: one to be occupied by the chief and his people, and the other by the Boers who would pay rent to the chief and the Cape government.

 

Kok quickly agreed to this plan as it ensured that all regions south of the Riet River would remain inalienable Griqua property, while the area north of the river, although remaining under his control, would be leased by the Boers who were British subjects. In 1845, Maitland appointed a British Resident to Transorangia to oversee the implementation of this system, a job which Major Douglas Warden took over.

 

Maitland’s time as Governor came to an end in 1847 and was replaced by Sir Henry Pottinger, who was then soon replaced by Sir Henry George Wakelyn Smith. Smith rebuked Maitland’s system of land tenure and declared that all rent from White tenant farmers on Griqua land north of the Riet River would divert to the Crown. In addition, Whites would be allowed to obtain farms to the south of the river in an area, in terms of Maitland’s system, that could never be settled by Whites. Smith suitably humbled Adam Kok into acceptance of these terms.

 

By 1861, the Griquas, tired of the constant friction with their Dutch neighbours in the Orange Free State, sold them their lands, before settling in the territory of Griqualand East. In 1867, the discovery of diamonds near Hopetown brought about enormous changes in the social and economic make-up of the region. Overnight the area became flooded with fortune-seekers from Europe, North America and Australia. The ownership of this area became the subject of conflicting claims from the Khoikhoi, Tswana and Dutch groups.

In March 1871, the diamond field claims were resolved in favour of the Khoikhoi leader Nicolaas Waterboer, who immediately petitioned the British for the annexation of his lands to the Cape Colony. As a result, on 27 October 1871 the diamond fields were proclaimed a British territory under the name of Griqualand West.

The Griquas derived no benefit from this; they were merely pawns in the hands of the Imperial authorities who were trying to acquire control over the mineral rich lands. In November 1876, Lieutenant- Governor Lanyon cleverly embarked on a surveying process with the intention of confining indigenous Black people to strategically placed rural locations which comprised about ten percent of the original Griqualand. The divisions of Barkley West, Hay, Herbert and Kimberley were probably proclaimed at about the same time.

However, the Cape Government, faced with the objections of both European settlers and indigenous residents, refused to incorporate the territory, and in 1873 Griqualand West was proclaimed a separate Crown Colony with its capital at Kimberley.

 

In 1876, Chief Waterboer, in whose name the diamond fields had been annexed, was arrested and imprisoned when he tried to free some of his followers from a prison work gang. On 5 August 1879, the Cape Parliament passed a Bill of Annexation, which was only implemented on 18 October 1880 (SESA 1972). A census taken in Griqualand West in 1877 revealed that the province had a total of 44,877 residents, of whom 12,374 were of European descent.

 

Griqualand East

 

In 1860, Adam Kok III trekked from the vicinity of Philippolis, where they had lost their lands to the emigrant Boers, to find a new home. They arrived in 1862 in the territory known as No Man’s Land, between the Cape and Natal. They lived in a larger for some ten years before founding their town of Kokstad.

Adam Kok III , Leader (Kokstad) Source: www.tokencoins.com © Scott Balson.
 

Insecure and distrustful, in 1869 Adam Kok requested that the territory of Griqualand East be annexed by the British, with the specific stipulation that it should not be brought under the direct rule of Natal even though he was granted full title to the land and total autonomy of government. Accordingly Griqualand was taken over in 1874, and although the Act of Annexation was passed by the Cape Parliament in 1877, it was not promulgated until 17 September 1879. The territory was initially divided into four magisterial districts centred at Matatiele, Mount Frere, Umzimkulu and Kokstad, later renamed Mount Currie.

 

Throughout the 1870s, Griqualand East, and its surrounding territories, were the object of competing tribal interests and complex political alliances. As a result, the British found it difficult to implement effective colonial rule over the region until the remainder of Pondoland was also brought under their control. The lands of the Xesibe, centred at Mount Ayliff, were brought under their administration in 1878, but were not annexed to the Cape Colony until 25 October 1886.

 

In 1886, a small pocket of land called the Rode Valley was purchased from the Mpondo chief Umquikela, and was added to Mount Ayliff by Act No 45 of 1887, which was confirmed on 15 September 1888. The annexation of Pondoland to the Cape was completed under Act No 5 of 1894, provisions of which also ceded a portion of western Pondoland to Griqualand East. As a result of this transfer the divisions of Mount Fletcher, Qumbu, Tsolo and Maclear were brought under its administration.

 

The Griquas soon became a minority in the area and soon began to sell their properties to both European settlers and Pondo farmers, who were beginning to prosper there. The census of 1891 indicated that Griqualand East had a population of 152 618 persons, of whom 9 071 were literate. By 1904, these figures had risen to 222 685 and 21 146 respectively.

 

By 1917, the surviving Griqua people, highly demoralized by their loss of independence, once more trekked to a site near Touws River in the Karoo but their attempt to find a new community failed and most returned to Kokstad.

 

Boer Republics and Griqua States in Southern Africa, 19th century. Source: www.tokencoins.com
 
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