Web application firewalls (WAF’s) are part of the defense in depth model
for web applications. While not a substitute for secure code, they offer
great options for filtering malicious input. Below is a story from a
real assessment where an enterprise deployment of such a device was
vulnerable to being bypassed. The vulnerability is one of a bad design
and/or configuration and as an attacker it was very useful. Read below
to find out more! ---------- Testing the security of an app in its
production deployment is important. While this app might have been
assessed in development or QA, when you deploy live you might introduce
new attack vectors due to configuration issues. Such was the case with
our fictional customer Heisenberg Bank. While firing up the assessment I
quickly ran into issues fuzzing all the application points I usually go
after first, see below: Well… that’s both humorous and unsatisfying.
After a bit of investigating I knew that I was up against a WAF that was
triggering on a few things: Rapid succession of POST request to
formsRapid succession of GET requests to *most* pagesLack of a CSRF
token*Bad* characters After one of these conditions were met it would
block me with said error code for 5 minutes. So, how to proceed? The
normal method of encoding payloads to bypass WAF regexes is hit or miss
these days. WAF’s have come a long ways. Still, I gave it a shot, no
dice. While waiting in one of my *timeouts* I decided to do some WAF
research. While going through several WAF implementation guides I found
a forum that mentioned integrating a WAF with your caching
service/device. It described a user’s trouble with standing up something
*like* Varnish or a proxy/accelerator appliance running on a different
host, and that the WAF was blocking that server. Of course the vendor
promptly replied that you can whitelist devices based on IP, allowing
them not be inspected by the WAF. At this point, everything is still
fine. Below is where things went bad for Heisenberg Bank and the WAF.
After reading more, I found that instead of doing a real lookup on
incoming requests (something akin to REMOTE_ADDR or something similar),
the WAF was looking at a *custom* HTTP header. This is how it’s supposed
to work if a user or other server contacts the WAF: Instead, the WAF
checks the requests HTTP Headers. The specific implementation was
checking the request for the header X-originating-IP. So, who would this
WAF be configured to trust? In this instance the default was… Itself!
Since I control all HTTP requests sent out of my browser I can easily
add this header fooling the WAF to think I was itself, allowing me to
bypass its protections completely: After further research there are
several headers that can be defined for WAF’s to whitelist (instead of
doing a proper lookup):
X-forwarded-forX-remote-IPX-originating-IPx-remote-addr There is also a
hit-list of *types* of addresses/configurations that *might* be
whitelisted/vulnerable. (some fictitious examples below): After figuring
out the bypass, the rest of the assessment yielded many other
vulnerabilities and was expedited due to the fact that I could bypass
the WAF. It was as simple as having my inline interception proxy add the
header to all requests. A simple solution is having your frontend proxy
strip all *non-standard* headers but then you’re still playing the cat
and mouse game of blacklisting. Better yet, consult with your WAF vendor
and see what headers are accepted and defaults are enabled. Then find a
solution that doesn’t rely on information that the attacker can forge.
In general you can also audit the security of HTTP headers on your site
using Gethead, a project from our dynamic testing team’s leader, Nathan
LaFollette (@httphacker). As always, feel free to reach out with any
questions via Twitter (@jhaddix) or via email (jason.haddix@hp.com).
Happy hacking! -------- Here at FoD we have a premium tier of our
dynamic application testing service. In this tier we give the app a
thorough grokking with one of our senior web penetration testers and our
industry leading tools. It goes through an extensive methodology driven
assessment. This vulnerability is akin to something that would show up
on that tier of test. To learn more about Fortify on Demand’s dynamic
assessments for web applications or mobile applications, visit the link
below: hp.com/go/fortifyondemand
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Scooped by
Srdjan Strbanovic
onto nodeJS and Web APIs March 19, 2014 5:02 PM
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