Digital Sovereignty & Cyber Security
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Digital Sovereignty & Cyber Security
From cyberwar to digital encryption, security issues to state sovereignty
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Scooped by Philippe J DEWOST
January 3, 2018 1:30 PM
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Kernel-memory-leaking Intel processor design flaw forces Linux, Windows redesign

Kernel-memory-leaking Intel processor design flaw forces Linux, Windows redesign | Digital Sovereignty & Cyber Security | Scoop.it
A fundamental design flaw in Intel's processor chips has forced a significant redesign of the Linux and Windows kernels to defang the chip-level security bug.Programmers are scrambling to overhaul the open-source Linux kernel's virtual memory system. Meanwhile, Microsoft is expected to publicly introduce the necessary changes to its Windows operating system in an upcoming Patch Tuesday: these changes were seeded to beta testers running fast-ring Windows Insider builds in November and December.Crucially, these updates to both Linux and Windows will incur a performance hit on Intel products. The effects are still being benchmarked, however we're looking at a ballpark figure of five to 30 per cent slow down, depending on the task and the processor model. More recent Intel chips have features – such as PCID – to reduce the performance hit. Your mileage may vary.
Philippe J DEWOST's insight:
Another reason to seriously consider open source hardware architectures ?
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Scooped by Philippe J DEWOST
September 15, 2017 4:04 AM
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High Sierra's 'Secure Kernel Extension Loading' is Broken

High Sierra's 'Secure Kernel Extension Loading' is Broken | Digital Sovereignty & Cyber Security | Scoop.it
With each new release of macOS, Apple introduces new 'built-in' security enhancements...and macOS High Sierra (10.13) is no exception. In this blog post we'll take a brief look at High Sierra's somewhat controversial "Secure Kernel Extension Loading" (SKEL) feature. Unfortunately while wrapped in good intentions, in it's current implementation, SKEL merely hampers the efforts of the 'good guys' (i.e. 3rd-party macOS developers such as those that design security products). Due to flaws in its implementation, the bad guys (hackers/malware) will likely remain unaffected. While many respected security researchers, system administrators, and macOS developers have voiced this concern, here we'll prove this by demonstrating a 0day vulnerability in SKEL's implementation that decisively bypasses it fully:$ kextstatIndex Refs Size Wired Name 1 90 0x9e30 0x9e30 com.apple.kpi.bsd2 8 0x3960 0x3960 com.apple.kpi.dsep...130 0 0x4b00 0x4b000 com.un.approved.kext Documented in Apple's Technical Note TN2459, Secure Kernel Extension Loading, is "a new feature that requires user approval before loading new third-party kernel extensions." Other good overviews of SKEL include:"Kextpocalypse - High Sierra and Kexts in the Enterprise""Kernel extensions and macOS High Sierra"While we might initially assume that that the main attack vector SKEL attempts to thwart is the (direct) loading of malicious kernel extensions (i.e. rootkits), I believe this is not the case. First, observe that (AFAIK), we have yet to see any signed kernel-mode macOS malware! Since OS X Yosemite, any kexts have to be signed with a kernel code-signing certificate. And unlike user-mode Developer IDs, Apple is incredibly 'protective' of such kernel code-signing certificates - only giving out a handful to legitimate 3rd-party companies that have justifiable reasons to create kernel code. As security features are often costly to implement, they are generally introduced to reactively address widespread issues. (Unless they are introduced as a control mechanism, under the guise of a 'security feature' (*cough cough*)).
Philippe J DEWOST's insight:
Cupertino listens I hope
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