Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait pumped $ 12 billion to Egypt after the army banned Islamist president Morsi, while Qatar has pumped $ 2 billion during Morsi's mandate. Apparently, Qatar strongly supports Muslim Brotherhood, whereas other GCC monarchies (except Oman) support Mubarak's 'remnants', additionally, Saudi Arabia support Salafists throughout the Arab World as an 'ideological' Wahhabi extent for the Saudi dynasty.
Dick Cheney was CEO of Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company (HOWCO), and then became vice-president of George W. Bush, one of wealthy Bush dynasty who invests in oil field. Moreover, Cheney's wife, Lynnne Cheney served as board member on Lockheed Martin Corp., a giant weapon's manufacturing company.
After Bill Clinton's election cost Cheney his government job, he wound up in 1995 as CEO of Halliburton Company, the Dallas-based oil services giant -- which just happens to own Brown & Root Services. Since then, Cheney has collected more than $10 million in salary and stock payments from the company. In addition, he is currently the company's largest individual shareholder, holding stock and options worth another $40 million. Those holdings have undoubtedly been made more valuable by the ever-more lucrative contracts BRS continues to score with the Pentagon.
This video from BBC Arabic. The guest is one of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood figures. The presenter is asking the guest : Why did Morsi cut of diplomatic relation with Syrian regime, in the meanwhile, he is preserving diplomatic relation with Israel despite its assaults against Palestinians. MB's figure answer as following: The Syrian president is killing his own people... while, there is peace treaty....Egypt is not in a condition to coup with that.
"With the ballot box available, why should there be recourse to the street?” It is an important question, and the answer, I believe, is the convergence of three phenomena. The first is the rise and proliferation of illiberal “majoritarian” democracies." He plagiarizes what he presented as his own "belief" to a recent article in the Economist magazine. I mean, I am not surprised. This man in years of writing and pontification, has not vomited one original idea or a new insight on any subject. This is a man who comes up wit cliches to compensate for his shallowness"
Beirut-based Al-Mayadeen Satellite Channel is acquiring high Arab viewers, according to my personal impression. The mentioned TV channel is transmitting 24-hours updated News on the Arab World. Apparently, there is 'media war' alongside military war in Syria between moderate Arab regimes versus Iranian-Syrian axis.
One can see an increasing growth of Al-Mayadeen TV channel in Palestine by naked eye in supermarkets, groceries. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya TV channels (GCC-funded) are clearly dropped down from top News channels due to two reasons: 1- Loss of neutrality, objectivity and credibility. 2- Ignoring the Palestinian cause as a pan-Arab question, moreover, Palestinian question is representing a cornerstone of Arab and Muslim 'patriotism'.
Al-Mayadeen TV Channel is being accused of being Iranian-funded by GCC propagandists, but there is no certain evidence. However, the mentioned channel is apparently shifted toward the Syrian regime regarding to Syrian crisis. Meanwhile, Al-Mayadeen channel has strict editorial line regarding to avoid bigotry.
Media War will persist as long as a parallel war of influence is running in the region, however, there is no 'charitable' News channels, i.e, there will be a news channel's sponsor, and so the question is: Which channel is representing people's affairs, opinions and hopes?... these criteria are simply the success formula.
Etiology: There is no single theory to explain fundamentalism in psychiatry. I personally classify it into primary and secondary. Primary fundamentalism is usually acquired in early adolescence and persisted later on, while secondary fundamentalism is usually acquired later on as a result of sudden shifting of person's belief.
Bigotry, Enthusiasm, Extremism and Radicalism are being used, sometimes, to describe the same meaning in common language.
Multifactorial etiology including socio-economic status, surrounding community and person's education play a major role in causing fundamentalism. However, secondary fundamentalism usually occurs as a result of 'Atonement of sins' regarding to religious fundamentalism, in which the person believes that restrict loyalty is a method for atonement of sins, thereafter, he/she usually believes that he/she belongs to the right group and different groups are wrong.
Fundamentalism has many different forms; it might be religious, political, gender, sectarian and ethnic (related to ethnicity).
Fadhel Shaker as a Case: Fadhel Shaker, former Lebanese singer. He was one of my favorite singers due to his warm and romantic songs which touch sensation.
I have no idea about his social background, but he shocked public opinion during Syrian crisis, not only because he retired from singing, but also because he converted Wahhabi doctrine and supported extremist Wahhabi cleric who actually a militia leader in Sidon City, Southern Lebanon.
Fadhel Shaker: conversion from a romantic singer into a Wahhabi fighter
Vice-chairman of Qatari-funded Union for Sunni clerics called "International Union for Muslim scholars" (IUMS) [metaphrase], Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah had a visit to the White House in June 13, to urge the US administration to take 'urgent action' to help Syrian rebels.
Sheikh Bin Bayyah (to the left) during a meeting in the White House
Bin Bayyah lobbied the White House to "take urgent action" to help Syrian rebels. "We demand Washington take a greater role in [Syria]," Bin Bayyah told Al-Jazeera. Obama later announced plansto arm Syrian rebels.
Few days a go, I have referred an eleven-years-old girl due to suspected colo-rectal tumor. The child returned back, yesterday after partial bowel resection. I was really sad for that, even when her father praised me and said: "Doctor, I trust you because you are the only doctor who accurately diagnosed my daughter". she was misdiagnosed before coming to my clinic.
Although I seem strong in front of my patients, my tears shed in their absence.
“Obama is running the biggest terrorist operation that exists, maybe in history: the drone assassination campaigns, which are just part of it [...] All of these operations, they are terror operations.” Drone strikes are “terror” because, Chomsky said, the attacks have the effect of “terrorizing” locals.” ... He recalled the recent congressional testimony of a Yemeni man named Farea al-Muslimi, who described how a single drone strike managed to “radicalize” his entire village against the United States.
Yetzhak Levi and his wife Orna, owners of Israeli (YVEL) Company for Jewelry are offering the most expensive pearl's necklace in the World ($1.3 million). They have received suggestion from Qatari official to buy the necklace for Saudi rich man in Bahrain, a tiny Gulf monarchy.
About 45 pro-Morsi protesters were killed today morning amid clashes between them and army. Both sides (Army and pro-MBs) launched contradicted stories about the bloody act. Clashes happened in front of Republic guard's headquarter, a branch of Egyptian Army.
Muslim Brotherhood accused the army of attacking protesters early in the morning during Al-Fajr praying time, whilst the Army denied that story and announced that they faced 'terrorist attack' by using guns and killed Mohammad Al-messeiry, an officer, according to the Army.
Both sides supported their narrations with videos. I watched journalistic conferences by both the Army and angry pro-MBs. There were same mentioned narrations, however, the Army spokesman said some hints about Syrian crisis. He also used some English terms such as : asymmetrical war, psychological warfare and war of information, regarding to counter-media which try to deform the army's picture in front of Egyptians, according to him, moreover, he launched some flashes which apparently express the Egyptian's Army position toward the Syrian crisis, for example, he said that Egypt does not face organized 'terrorist groups' as in Syria.
Muslim Brotherhood try to escalate the situation by gathering a millionized rallies against the Army hoping to repeat Venezuelan scenario in 2002, when Venezuelans returned back president Hugo Chavez to residency after a US-backed military coup, nevertheless, current events, apparently, far from Venezuela's scenario because Morsi is not Chavez, as the later supported low social class and had multiple communication skills to contact with people, in addition, to his military background, unlike Egypt's Morsi does.
Civil War is not closer to occur in Egypt now a days, however, there are hyper-polarized rallies which might be transformed into bloody clashes. Furthermore, The Egyptian Army is unlike Syrian Army which is a target goal for GCC-NATO alliance due to supporting Hezbollah and Syrian-Iranian 'formal' and strategic alliance, thus the GCC-NATO alliance will not provide external military and political aid to destroy Egyptian Army as they do in Syria.
Black Scenario might occur if the Egyptian Army forbid Muslim Brotherhood as well as Salafis (Wahhabis) from political participation and/or organization (in form of parties), they might use secret armed groups against regime and they will disbelieve in democratic regime which banned them, the same intermittent scenario occurred in 1960s-1970s.
Egyptian military defense, Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi announced that Mohammad Morsi is no longer the president, and asked head of Egypt's constitutional court to temporarily occupy the position till the next presidential elections. Positive revolutionary signs are toppling post-Mubarak president who continued the same internal and external policies. Moreover, current popular demonstrations are much more wider than ever, according to images analysis. (1 meter for a protester). There is no doubt that Morsi did not touch people's ambitions for a real change in Egypt.
However, Egypt is now actually ruled by a military council, a dependent establishment on the US pentagon by both financial aids and military installations, so the US administration side-by-side with Israel will supervise and contain, in form or another, the council's policies and the newly appointed president is one of Mubarak's regime figures.
Anti-Morsi demonstrations were larger than ever during the last few days, however, a relatively smaller demonstrations like Al-Adaweyyah were supporting Morsi by Islamist's popular mass. Egyptian Army had only two choices; either to observe 'hyper-polarized' contradicted popular demonstrations or to interfere political scene. Egyptian Army has strong ties with Pentagon and the US offers more than a $ billion annually, thus US administration will guaranty a 'hidden hands' of intervention in the Egyptian situation, nevertheless, popular demonstrations will remain all the time as the 'revolution's parameter', for example, Qatari intervention was, undoubtedly, one of important anger stimulants against Morsi's foreign policies and neoliberal economic plans. Detaining leaders of Muslim Brotherhood is one of oppressing act by Military Council because they have the right to express their objections and opinions. Egypt's Uprising will determine the region's future in all circumstances, however, Both internal and external powers will try all the time to manipulate. I believe that people's activity in form of Tahrir-style will determine the track and the fate of Egypt's uprising, despite foreign and local interference.
Current Islamized regime in Egypt is an extent for the toppled Mubarak's regime on economic, social and political levels and the revolution, by definition, is a changing process vertically and subsequently horizontally in a specific society.
Morsi's regime has continued the previous economic policies in Egypt; It depended on external international loans from International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to balance running-costs of the country's budget. Muslim Brotherhood, also has increased the sectarian polarization in the region amid the Syrian crisis; for example, their grand Sheikh, Yousef Al-Qaradawi attacked the Syrian regime upon sectarian principles, other than a clear political dispute. Egypt's Morsi lacks Charisma and convenience's skills which are necessary for people's contact. The Exterior policies are also an extent for Mubarak's regime; tight relations with Israel, the same old alliance with GCC dynasties which are closer to France's Louis XVI regime as a model of ruling than any current regime. Moreover, The same head-tail relationship with the United States. Thus, Egyptian people have already bearded Mubarak and so what would they lose if they topple the second president. Lifelong for the revolution....Vive la révolution.....
Non-Steroidal Anti-inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs) are proven to cause heart attack, according to study presented in Annual Congress of the European League Against Rheumatism.
Dr. Carl Orr from Department of Medicine, Royal College of Surgeons said : "The side effect profile and safety of NSAIDs has been commonly reported, but little is known about treatment duration and its implications for cardiovascular risk. This data demonstrates an immediate increase in the risk of death and MI [heart attack], challenging the safety of even short-term use. The introduction of physician guidelines to assist safe prescribing of this class of drug is vital, and the only way to keep patient safety at the forefront of disease management".
NSAIDs are also proven to cause Gastro-intestinal bleeding especially among old people, and may exaggerate Asthmatic attacks.
Undoubtedly, this is the most accurate discussion I have read about the Syrian Crisis, based on facts, knowledge and scientific terms, The following post is republished from the Angry Arab Blog.
1) How do you characterize what is happening in Syria? to what extent it is a revolution and to what extent it is not? The original demonstrations that erupted among the Deraa peasantry were, by all appearances spontaneous, their proximal cause being the maltreatment by regime goons of children who scribbled anti regime graffiti. The unrest has been brewing for a while, coming at the confluence of several factors including a bulging population with high youth unemployment, severe drought that disrupted the agrarian strata, neoliberal policies that favored a pro-regime compradore class and so on. The demonstrations spread nation-wide and seemed in the beginning to have a semblance of trans-sectarian support, notwithstanding obvious hesitations among minorities. They also seem to have garnered the support many educated youth and elements of the middle class. Still, even at this early phase, the regime continued to carry significant support among the populace, evidenced by counter demonstrations and rallies. At first, there was no revolutionary agenda to the protests. The militarization of the protests happened in stages, first in the Rastan-Hums area (which has a large cadre of Sunni staff officers) and then to the North and East. I would say that the militarization process was encouraged and later guided by outside forces, notably Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, explicitly supported by the US and European/NATO actors. The influx of Jihadis followed, a la Afghan model of the 1980s, and sponsored by the aforementioned countries. Old habits die hard… Do the protests, and the intense bloodshed that followed and continues to this date, amount to a revolution? So far, and this may surprise or even dismay some of your readers, I would say no. This conclusion is made in the context that even if the regime is deposed, you will not have a profound change in the class structure of society, nor the prominence of the military and its centrality as an institution, nor a dramatically different economic policy that would deviate from the neoliberal tendencies of the recent past. This does not mean that the uprising was lacking in a revolutionary potential, but it was not realized. The chances of its realization now are, to my mind, very small. The discussion on whether the current upheaval is an uprising or a rebellion versus a revolution is more than semantics, for it foretells the shape of the regime that would follow. Politically, my anticipation is that there would be lip service to a democratic future, but chances are that there would be an authoritarian regime in place that is in structural continuity with this one. In short, unlike what had happened in other revolutions of the past, such as the French, Russian and the Chinese, the basic building blocs of the current regime and their power relation would not change. What would ensue is a game of musical chairs of one nexus of power being displaced in favored of another.
2) How do you explain the resilience of the regime, especially that you, among my friends, always have been suspicious of Western media predictions of an imminent fall of the regime. The cartoonish representation of the regime as an isolated tyrant versus the people should be pushed aside in favor of a broader and more deeply rooted power base that encompasses a wide swath of society that benefits from (the regime’s) continuation versus those that do not. The regime garners support from different groups, including the minorities and some of the Sunnis. It also has the support of the key urban classes of Damascus and Aleppo, especially among the upper/middle upper classes. One has to remember that the authoritarianism of Hafiz Al-Asad was popular in the early seventies precisely because of the chaos of the fifties and sixties and the promise it presented (to the merchant groups in particular) of stability. The current chaos, like the previous one, reflects a historic failure of the Syrian polity to come up with a consensus on a common political “form” structure. The current regime capitalizes on this chronic instability to present itself as the sole guarantor of continued Syrian state.
3) To what extent the uprising in Syria was spontaneous and to what extent it was not? I answered that to some extent under the first question. Undoubtedly, it is a mixture of both. There is no denying the intense and legitimate internal grievances that led to the uprising. However, the conflict could not have been militarized and propagated for so long without intervention by outside powers, now true on both sides of the civil war. This intervention can only be seen in the context of the regional and international jousting for hegemony in the region. The more interesting aspect of this intervention is that by Western powers and their local actors. If Syria follows the fate of Libya, then the Mediterranean will become a veritable NATO pond. It will also invigorate the quest to control Energy sources in Asia and corner China, which is a key aim of the series of oil wars we have witnessed in Western Asia over the last decades.
4) What do you think Saudi Arabia and Qatar want from Syria? There is more than one cause for the intervention. The failure of the American invasion of Iraq left these countries vulnerable to political challenges from their own populations, and from Iran. The Syria intervention is a pre-emptive strike to turn the political crisis those regimes face into a Sunni-Shiaa sectarian fight. Their efforts are in line with the overall American/NATO policy of maintaining control over the Middle East. That policy, embedded in the Project for New American Century, remains embedded in American policies even while it has faced difficulties with the failure of the Iraq intervention. Thus, both Qatar and Saudi Arabia are bit players in a larger scheme of things.
5) What will the impact of Hizbullah’s announced intervention be? In Lebanon and in Syria. Hizballah has been placed in a difficult position. I do not believe it went into the conflict willingly, but rather under pressure from the emerging situation on the ground, with the Syrian opposition actively seeking to cut its land route to Damascus as a prelude to its own isolation and destruction. The armed wing of the Syrian opposition has been totally subservient with the Gulfies and their American/NATO sponsors, and as such its threat to Hizballah is existential. Where Hizballah is at a disadvantage is in its own sectarian grounding. It has helped it enormously during the resistance phase of its existence (1985-2000), but it has become a liability. At heart, it renders it unable to formulate a trans-sectarian narrative. It is also hampered by its own reluctance to identify with any class dimensions of its struggle, hence its inability to forge alliances in Lebanon outside the traditional sectarian ones. With that in mind, Hizballah remains far truer to its base in Lebanon and to the aspiration of the people of the region for an anti-colonial regime than anything on offer by its enemies. 6) Are we now witnessing a great historical transformation in our region? Are you looking forward to the outcome? This is the most important question of the bunch, and the saddest to answer. The end of the cold war ushered a breakdown in the post World War Two Arab order, occasioned by the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the split in the Arab League, the “forced” invitation of foreign troops and the subsequent 1991 Iraq War. At the time, I formed the opinion that the classical Sykes Picot arrangement could only be maintained by the force of Arms of the Americans and NATO allies. It is quite possible that similar to Yugoslavia in 1990s, many Arab countries may suffer divisions or at least internal re-ordering. Sudan and Iraq have already gone this way, and Syria may follow suite. It is a very fluid situation. I have been of the opinion that the Arab spring has been exploited by Western powers and their local allies as means of better integrating the Arab world into the world capitalist order. What you see is the dismantling of one Arab state after the other, followed by its take over by compradore elites (prominently featuring Muslim Brotherhood types) that are more extreme in their allegiance to neoliberal economics than even their counterparts in the West are. The sad part of my response is that whereas previously the colonial designs on the Arab world were met with an intellectual and nationalistic response, galvanized around the issue of Palestine, no such response is currently coherent. Things may change, of course, but it is a very dangerous moment. I remain convinced that the prime responsibility of the Arab intelligentsia is dual: to resist imperialism and internal despotism. The two were related then, and remain so today.
7) What is Turkey’s agenda in Syria and beyond? The collapse of a political Arab project, signaled by the 1990 gulf war and the split in the Arab league at the time, ushered a period of political vacuum that has been filled to some extent by the historic duo of Iran and Turkey. Turkey’s entry was not spontaneous, but actively encouraged by the Americans as means of having a heavy weight Sunni power that can act synergistically with Israel to maintain American interests in the region. Egypt would have been the Arab candidate for such a role, but Egypt has been a failed state since Sadat’s time. Chances are Egypt would not make a come back any time soon. What is Turkey’s agenda? Turkey seeks to reestablish an economic and social zone of interest the echoes that of the Ottoman Empire, yet well integrated into the world capitalist economy. With the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood sponsored regimes in the Arab world, it may have a shot at it. However, Turkey is a medium sized country that is not big enough, like China, the EU or the US, to establish an independent project. It will be an important but subordinate deputy to the big league players of the world. Libya was a case in point. When the Turks voiced opposition to the NATO intervention in Libya, they suddenly were made to realize that their investments in the country in excess of $30 billion were at stake. Overnight they made a complete turnaround in their position.
8) Is class analysis useful in analyzing Syrian conflict? It is an important component in understanding the internal dynamics of the many Arab conflicts, including the Syrian one, although it is not the sole factor at work. I think there is an interplay between the internal contradictions of class and the external interventions, much as we have seen before in Iraq. It provides an important layer in a multi layered situation, but absent its recognition no serious analysis of what is going on can take place.
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani is now the new Emir of Qatar. His father met the royal family to tell them about his decision of appointing his son who was the crown-prince. The Qatari dynasty believe that they lead the progressive reform in the Arab World, according to their 'political behavior' in the region. Thus, Qatari-funded media are celebrating what-so-called 'democratic event' of crowning the new Emir as an exceptional event!. GCC Sheikhs congratulated Qatari counter-part for the new position. With a weak Arabic language, the new Emir read a televised speech, announcing the new Qatari policies. Actually, the new Emir emphasized on continuation of his father's policies. I had a short vocation, however, I read congratulations on social media sites by Qatari-funded propagandists. Logically, these congratulations are inevitable, nevertheless, they are the same propagandists who theorize what-so-called 'Syrian revolution' which actually sponsored by Arab Gulf's tyrants.
I am blogging amid fireworks here in Palestine to celebrate talent Palestinian singer. Comments: 1- This is what the occupation wants, to be busy with dance and songs. The first establishment that in-exile Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) did, when they returned to Palestine is to build Giant Disco and gambling Casino. I mean they did that before even opening a university or hospital! Unfortunately, This is the Gulf-funded TV shows which gather 'Arab people'. This post needed courage to disagree with All ruling Authorities in Palestine, but I should say my opinion any way. 2- Congratulations to Mohammad Assaf, winner star because he really deserve to be a pop-star.
CIA agents have been training Syrian rebels since 2012, according to L.A. Times. Training includes the use of Anti-tank and Anti-aircraft missiles and has been carried out in Jordan and Turkey. About 20 to 45 fighters at a time, began last November at a new US base in the desert in southwest Jordan.
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