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How to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems in principal-agent relations
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Daily Digest 5/17 - The Moral Hazard Of 'Too Big To Fail', Judge ...

Daily Digest 5/17 - The Moral Hazard Of 'Too Big To Fail', Judge ... | Information Economics | Scoop.it
Bill Black: On JP Morgan's "Hedge", Jamie Dimon's Integrity, and the Epic Conflicts of Interest in the Federal Reserve System Why Plunging Commodity Prices Are Ominous For Stock Market Hot Money Bets Backed By ...
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Neither Public Nor Private: A Health-Care System Muddling Through ...

Neither Public Nor Private: A Health-Care System Muddling Through ... | Information Economics | Scoop.it
to discourage “adverse selection”–the tendency of only unhealthy people to buy health insurance if insurers must accept all applicants. Pharmaceuticals are regulated because few consumers have the information or ability to ...
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The Continent’s moral hazard

Can the continent endure austerity?(Breaking tweet #1000 with this: Greece is a living and breathing example of moral hazard.)...
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The Continent's moral hazard

The Continent's moral hazard | Information Economics | Scoop.it
Europe's economic struggles are a consistent drag on American growth. A eurozone breakup, in chaos and acrimony, could be a Lehman-like shock of incalculable damage.
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Guest Post: Asymmetric Information in the Banking Sector: How ...

Guest Post: Asymmetric Information in the Banking Sector: How ... | Information Economics | Scoop.it
In this paper, I will discuss how information asymmetry is a key determinant of interest rates and how it lead to adverse selection and moral hazard – two possible occurrences which are clearly not pleasant to bankers.
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Economics - Unit 1 Micro: Market Failure Glossary

Adverse selection. Where the expected value of a transaction is known more accurately by the buyer or the seller due to an asymmetry of information; e.g. health insurance. Asymmetric information. Occurs when somebody ...
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Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS

Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. Fees are paid when the bank's performance is on target and liquidation arises when the bank's ...
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Love Stinks: An Economic Manifesto - The Atlantic

Love Stinks: An Economic Manifesto - The Atlantic | Information Economics | Scoop.it
Love Stinks: An Economic ManifestoThe AtlanticThe past few years have seen much ink spilled over problems of exchange that ended up in the policy spotlight -- from adverse selection in insurance markets to herding behavior in capital markets.
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The end of crony capitalism? - Rediff

The end of crony capitalism? - Rediff | Information Economics | Scoop.it
RediffThe end of crony capitalism?RediffDesigning incentive-compatible systems of resource concessions that protect the interest of those affected by the externality is difficult.
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Signals in Social Supernets

Signals in Social Supernets | Information Economics | Scoop.it
Computer Mediated Communication: The Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication (Are most tweets or posts spontaneous or some form of signalling?
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If “Universal Health Care” is so good, should we also have ...

First, because of asymmetric information, when there is risk and uncertainty about a person's future health, health insurance markets are badly affected by adverse selection and moral hazard. Second, because the private ...
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Amazon Kindle: A Highlight and Note from Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance

Amazon Kindle: A Highlight and Note from Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance | Information Economics | Scoop.it
“Capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell.” (Crisis Economics: the problem of moral hazard http://t.co/PPVapy9i #Kindle...)...
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Greece represents a moral hazard to European economies

Greece represents a moral hazard to European economies | Information Economics | Scoop.it
The survival of the euro is possible, but it requires the working of an immensely complicated machine, writes Michael Gerson. The jamming of any gear could immobilize it. A breakup would be felt across the Atlantic.
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Heterogeneity, Demand for Insurance and Adverse Selection

Recent empirical work finds that surprisingly little variation in the demand for insurance is explained by heterogeneity in risks. I distinguish between heterogeneity in risk preferences and risk perceptions underlying the ...
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Credit Crunch, Bank Failures, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection ...

Credit Crunch, Bank Failures, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection ... | Information Economics | Scoop.it
Can you say Adverse Selection: “Anti-selection, or negative selection is a term used in economics, insurance, statistics, and risk management. On the most abstract level, it refers to a market process in which "bad" results occur due to ...
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The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual ...

Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntary cooperation. Further ... Implicit incentives have a strong positive effect on effort only under non-incentive compatible contracts.
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The impact of commitment on nonrenewable resources ...

However, those contracts may not be incentive compatible if the discount factor and the second period price are high and thus the regulator may be forced to implement a pooling contract. Read Full: The impact of commitment ...
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Research Events | The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Research Events | The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis | Information Economics | Scoop.it
Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Seller Disclosure …: http://t.co/TfDY4zwU... http://t.co/tHjVjZz9...
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Recommended Reading: Russell Korobkin’s “Bounded Rationality, Moral Hazard, and the Case for Relative Value Health Insurance” : HEALTH REFORM WATCH

Recommended Reading: Russell Korobkin’s “Bounded Rationality, Moral Hazard, and the Case for Relative Value Health Insurance” : HEALTH REFORM WATCH | Information Economics | Scoop.it
Recommended Reading: Russell Korobkin's ... - Health Reform Watch: Posts from Health Reform Watch ...
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Adverse Selection, Price Discovery And Coordinated Central Bank Action - Seeking Alpha

Adverse Selection, Price Discovery And Coordinated Central Bank Action - Seeking Alpha | Information Economics | Scoop.it
Adverse Selection, Price Discovery And Coordinated Central Bank Action http://t.co/Y6EisDaM...
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